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AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION IS WORTH A POUND OF
CURE: THE NEED FOR STATES TO LEGISLATE IN
THE AREA OF HOSPITAL PROFESSIONAL REVIEW
COMMITTEE PROCEEDINGS
Currently, courts must untangle a web of legal theories to resolve suits
that physicians, alleging that a hospital professional review committee
wrongfully has revoked the physician's medical staff privileges, have brought
against the members of professional review committees.' State legislatures
have the power to enact legislation that can ease the courts' burden and
simultaneously improve the professional review process. 2 State legislatures
should use their power to streamline the law applicable to physicians'
antitrust suits against the members of hospital professional review committees that have revoked the physicians' hospital medical staff privileges.3
To comply with accreditation standards that the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations has established, 4 most hospital
bylaws require that the members of the hospital's medical staff organize a
professional review committee. 5 One significant purpose of the professional

1. See infra notes 25-100 and accompanying text (describing analysis necessary to resolve
antitrust cases physicians have brought against members of professional review committees).
2. See infra notes 170-75 and accompanying text (explaining that state legislatures can
enact legislation to simplify legal analysis necessary to resolve physicians' antitrust actions
against members of professional review committees).
3. See infra notes 201-10 and accompanying text (explaining how state legislation can
simplify judicial analysis of antitrust cases physicians have brought against members of
professional review committees).
4. See generally Joint Comm'n on Accreditation of Healthcare Orgs., 1989 Accreditation
Manual for Hospitals (1988) [hereinafter JCAH Manual] (describing hospital accreditation
procedures and criteria). Although participation in the accreditation program of the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAH) is entirely voluntary,
hospitals seek JCAH accreditation for two significant reasons. See 1 W. LAZARus, E. LEVINE,
L. LEWIN, LEwN & Assocs., INC., COMPETION AMONG HEALTi PRACTITIONERS: Tim INFLuENCE OF THE MEDICAL PROFESSION ON THE HEALTH MANPOWER MARKET

IV-10 (Executive

Summary & Final Rep't, Rep't for Federal Trade Comm'n, Feb. 1981) (discussing importance
of JCAH accreditation). First, JCAH accreditation is a prerequisite for certain federal funding
programs and other institutional benefits. Id. For example, JCAH accreditation meets the
certification requirements necessary for the hospital to receive Medicare funding. Id. Also,
Blue Cross contracts typically require covered patients to receive treatment at hospitals that
the JCAH has accredited or hospitals that comply with standards comparable to those that
JCAH has set for hospital accreditation. Id. Second, a hospital must receive JCAH accreditation
for residency accreditation, which is necessary if the hospital is affiliated with a medical school.
Id. Finally, JCAH accreditation provides a hospital with increased respectability in the medical
community. Id. Consequently, the majority of the hospitals in America participate in the
JCAH accreditation program. Id.
5. See JCAH Manual, supra note 4, MS.3.5, at 108 (requiring medical staff to organize
executive committee to grant, delineate, and terminate individual clinical privileges, and
organization of medical staff's quality assurance activities); see also Kopit, Commentary:
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review committee is to assess the competence and professional conduct of
6
the physicians currently holding medical staff privileges at the hospital.
Medical staff privileges provide physicians with the right to perform medical

procedures within a hospital and to participate in the hospital's governing
structure. 7 If the professional review committee finds that a staff physician's
performance adversely affects the quality of patient care at the hospital,
either because the physician's performance endangers patient health or

disrupts the medical staff, the professional review committee may recommend to the hospital's governing board that the hospital revoke the physician's medical staff privileges at the hospital.8 Without medical staff privileges,

ProfessionalPeer Review and the Antitrust Laws, 36 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 1170, 1172 (1986)

(defining "professional peer review" as process whereby hospital establishes standards for
appropriate quality of care and then medical staff judges individual physicians for compliance
with standards); Havighurst, ProfessionalPeer Review and the Antitrust Laws, 36 CASE W.
REs. L. REv. 1117, 1117 (1986) (defining "professional peer review" as fellow physicians
overseeing practices of individual physicians for purpose of maintaining quality and containing
cost of medical care).
6. See JCAH Manual, supra note 4, QA.2.1, at 220 (requiring medical staff to monitor
and evaluate quality of patient care and performance of all individuals with privileges). JCAH
accreditation standards require the hospital medical staff to review individual physicians'
qualifications for medical staff membership when a physician applies for membership, every
two years for reappointment purposes, and upon allegations of misconduct or incompetence.
See id. MS.3.5.2.1.3, MS.5.2, at 108, 115 (requiring medical staff to review applications,
reappointments, and quality of care). The hospital's professional review committee reviews
applications from physicians seeking medical staff privileges at the hospital and makes recommendations to the hospital's governing board. See id. MS.3.5.2, MS.3.5.2.1.3 to 3.5.2.1.4, at
108 (requiring medical staff executive committee to recommend to governing body individuals
for medical staff membership and delineated clinical privileges for each eligible individual).
After the hospital has granted an applicant physician membership on the medical staff, JCAH
accreditation standards require physicians to apply for reappointment to the hospital medical
staff at least every two years. Id. MS.5.2, at 115. In addition to conducting professional
review of a physician's professional conduct on a regular basis for reappointment purposes,
JCAH accreditation standards require the medical staff to review a physician's conduct when
department heads or medical staff members identify important problems in patient care and
clinical performance. Id. MS.6.1.1.4, at 118. In both the reappointment proceedings and
proceedings initiated by allegations of misconduct, the professional review committee considers
a number of factors, including incompetence, habitual use of intoxicants or drugs, mental or
physical impairments that adversely may affect patient care, liability in medical negligence or
malpractice actions, failure to comply with the policies that a quality assurance commission
has established, and ability to harmonize with other staff members. See Dolan & Ralston,
Hospital Admitting Privileges and the Sherman Act, 18 Hous. L. REv. 707, 712 (1981)
[hereinafter Dolan & Ralston] (stating that hospitals can revoke physician's medical staff
privileges for any reason related to performance).
7. See Kissam, Webber, Bigus, & Holzgraefe, Antitrust and HospitalPrivileges: Testing
the Conventional Wisdom, 70 CALn'. L. REv. 595, 596 n.1 (1982) [hereinafter Kissam] (stating
that physicians with medical staff privileges have right to perform medical procedures within
hospital and to participate in hospital's governing structure).
8. See Dolan & Ralston, supra note 6, at 712 (stating that hospital can revoke medical
staff privileges due to misconduct, incompetence, debilitation, or any other reason related to
performance). In addition to revoking a physician's privileges because the physician is incompetent, a professional review committee may recommend that the hospital revoke the physician's

1989]

PROFESSIONAL REVIEW COMMITTEES

a physician is unable to have his patients admitted to the hospital or to
treat his patients during their stays in the hospital. 9 Therefore, the lack of
medical staff privileges at a local hospital disadvantages a physician as he
competes with other physicians practicing in the same geographic area. 0
Moreover, a physician who has lost medical staff privileges as the result of
an unfavorable professional review decision bears the stigma of a secondclass physician in the eyes of the medical community and consumers."
Thus, the professional review committee's decision to grant or withdraw a
physician's medical staff privileges can determine the success of the physi2
cian's future career.'

medical staff privileges because the physician's behavior disrupts the operation of the hospital.
See J. HORTY, ACTON Krr FOR HosPrrAL LAw 1 (1984) (stating that courts have upheld
hospitals' authority to terminate physicians whose behavior disrupts hospital operations). Horty
distinguishes disruptive physicians from physicians whose lifestyles are not to the liking of
medical staff members, but who competently treat patients and do not foment trouble among
the staff members. Id. at 2. Unlike physicians who are merely different or unorthodox, the
behavior of disruptive physicians affects the ability of others to successfully complete their
jobs. Id.
9. See Note, Denying Hospital Privileges to Non-Physicians: Does Quality of Care
Justify a PotentialRestraint of Trade?, 19 IND. L. Ray. 1219, 1222 (1986) (stating that health
care provider must have medical staff privileges to admit patients to hospital and to care for
patients in hospital). A physician without medical staff privileges at a hospital loses many
important opportunities. See Dolan & Ralston, supra note 6, at 714 (discussing various
opportunities physicians without medical staff privileges lose). For example, a physician without
medical staff privileges at the hospital where his patient wishes to receive medical treatment
must refer the patient to a physician with medical staff privileges at that hospital. Weiss v.
York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 792 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1060 (1985). Consequently,
the patient's physician loses the opportunity to treat and charge his patient. Id. Furthermore,
the patient may choose to retain the new physician upon the patient's release from the hospital.
Id. at 794. In addition to losing the physician's patients to a physician with medical staff
privileges, a physician without medical staff privileges loses opportunities to attract new patients.
Dolan & Ralston, supra note 6, at 714. Members of the hospital's medical staff often staff
the hospital's emergency room. Id. Because patients admitted to the emergency room frequently
have no regular physician, those physicians working in the emergency room attract new
patients. Id. Also, a physician without medical staff privileges loses an opportunity to work
with other physicians who might wish to enter a referral relationship. See id. (explaining that
physician with medical staff privileges might enter joint referral relationship with other
physicians on staff). Lastly, a physician without medical staff privileges cannot participate in
a community that evaluates the physician's skills and provides educational opportunities. See
id. (stating that physicians with medical staff privileges belong to community that evaluates
physicians' skills and provides educational opportunities). Because physicians often practice in
unsupervised outpatient clinics with few educational opportunities, hospitals frequently serve
as the only practical place where physicians may receive the benefits of evaluation and
education, particularly in locations far from a medical school. Id.
10. See Dolan & Ralston, supra note 6, at 714 (stating that physician without medical
staff privileges has competitive disadvantage with other physicians practicing in same geographic
area).
11. See id. (stating that physician who has lost medical staff privileges bears stigma of
second-class physician).
12. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text (describing effects loss of medical staff
privileges has on physician's career).
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Because of the importance of medical staff privileges to the successful
practice of medicine, physicians who believe that a hospital, acting on the
recommendation of a professional review committee, unjustly has revoked
or denied their medical staff privileges have brought suit against the members
of professional review committees to regain lost privileges. 3 One legal
method physicians have used to seek recourse against allegedly wrongful
professional review actions is a federal antitrust action. 14 In fact, in recent
years, physicians who have lost medical staff privileges as a result of
unfavorable professional review actions have filed a large number of antitrust actions in federal courts against hospitals and the members of professional review committees. 5

13. See Enders, FederalAntitrust Issues Involved in the Denial of Medical Staff Privileges,
17 LoY. U. Cm. L.J. 331, 331 (1986) [hereinafter Enders] (stating that hospital's exclusion of
physician from access to hospital facilities may result in substantial economic damage sufficient
to motivate physician to file lawsuit); Havighurst, Doctors and Hospitals: An Antitrust
Perspective on TraditionalRelationships, 1984 DuKE L.J. 1071, 1076 [hereinafter Doctors and
Hospitals] (noting recent increase in litigation concerning revocations of physicians' hospital
admitting privileges).
14. See Doctors and Hospitals, supra note 13, at 1076 n.13 (stating that nearly half of
pending antitrust cases in health care industry involve disputes over medical staff privileges);
Kissam, supra note 7, at 596 (stating that in recent years disappointed applicants for medical
staff privileges have filed increasing number of antitrust claims against hospitals and medical
staffs). In addition to filing a federal antitrust action to regain lost medical staff privileges,
physicians may rely on other legal theories to regain their lost privileges. Id. at 601 n.21.
First, the physician may allege that the hospital deprived him of privileges in violation of
constitutional and common-law due process requirements. See generally McCall, A Hospital's
Liabilityfor Denying, Suspending and GrantingStaff Privileges, 32 BAYLOR L. REv. 175 (1980)
(discussing various theories of common-law and constitutional liability that physicians may use
against hospital that has revoked physician's privileges). Second, the physician may allege that
the hospital's actions violated state statutes granting physicians' procedural and substantive
rights. See N.Y. PuB. HEALa LAW § 2801-b(l), (2) (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1989) (providing
that, if hospital governing board has terminated physician's medical staff privileges without
stating reasons, physician may file complaint with state public health council). Finally, the
physician may allege that the hospital has violated various contract and tort theories. See 132
CONG. REC. H9954, H9963 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1986) (statement of Rep. Tauke) (noting that
physicians bring defamation actions against members of professional review committees);
Kissam, supra note 7, at 601 n.21 (stating that physician may bring contract and tort actions
against hospital).
15. See Marrese v. Interqual, Inc., 748 F.2d 373, 381 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that, since
late 1970s, federal antitrust courts have been deluged with hospital privileges suits), cert.
denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1985). Although some conflict among physicians traditionally has
existed, recent economic changes in the market for health care and hospital services have
intensified the conflict between physicians who have medical staff privileges and those physicians
who do not have medical staff privileges, resulting in an increased number of antitrust cases
involving medical staff privileges. Note, Denying Hospital Privileges to Non-Physicians: Does
Quality of Care Justify a Potential Restraint of Trade?, 19 IND. L. REv. 1219, 1223 (1986).
These economic changes include federal and state governmental attempts to limit health care
costs by curbing hospital growth. See Kissam, supra note 7, at 599 (explaining that federal
and state governments have attempted to curb hospital growth to limit health care costs). At
the same time that federal and state governments have attempted to curb hospital growth,
however, the supply of physicians in the country has increased dramatically, a trend experts
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Physicians who file antitrust actions against the members of professional
review committees attempt to prove that by terminating the physicians'
medical staff privileges the committee members sought to restrain compe-

tition in the market for medical services.

6

The physicians proceed on the

theory that because physicians without medical staff privileges at a local

hospital cannot compete effectively against physicians in the geographical
area who have medical staff privileges, the physician committee members
7
have restrained competition by wrongfully excluding potential competitors.

A plaintiff physician who has filed an antitrust action against the members
of a professional review committee may seek various remedies, including
monetary damages and injunctive relief. 8
Although a physician's theory of recovery in an antitrust suit against
the members of a professional review committee is analogous to other
antitrust suits, the legal analysis necessary to resolve a physician's antitrust
suit against the members of a professional review committee is more complex
than the analysis required to resolve other, more common types of antitrust
suits.' 9 Because legislators desire to protect consumers from incompetent

physicians, the subjects of medical care quality and hospital regulation are
areas of particular legislative concern.-0 Congress, therefore, has enacted

project will continue for several decades. See id. (stating that recent expansion of American
medical schools will increase substantially number of physicians practicing in this country
during next several decades); Katz, Warner, & Whittington, The Supply of Physicians and
Physicians' Incomes: Some Projections, 2 J. HEALTH PoL., POt'Y & L. 227, 228 (1977) (listing
six factors contributing to increased supply of physicians). See generally BUREAU oF HEALTH
PROFESSIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & Hum" SERvs., PROJECTIONS OF PHYSICIAN SUPPLY IN
Tm U.S. (1985) (projecting supply of physicians in United States through year 2000). As these
discordant trends continue, the barriers to hospital staff privileges that some physicians already
have experienced will grow. See Kissam, supra note 7, at 599 (stating that barriers to hospital
staff privileges will continue as governments attempt to curb hospital growth and supply of
physicians increases).
16. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1985) (prohibiting all combinations and conspiracies that
restrain trade illegally and monopolies).
17. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text (discussing importance of medical staff
privileges).
18. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1985) (permitting court to award treble damages and
injunctive relief to successful antitrust plaintiffs).
19. Compare infra notes 25-100 and accompanying text (summarizing analysis necessary
to resolve physician's antitrust action against professional review committee members that have
revoked physician's privileges-analysis much longer than basic antitrust analysis) with infra
notes 73-100 and accompanying text (summarizing basic antitrust analysis). The judicial analysis
necessary to resolve antitrust actions that physicians have brought against professional review
committee members is longer than basic antitrust analysis because the court also must apply
the standards that the HCQIA requires. See infra notes 25-100 and accompanying text
(summarizing analysis necessary to resolve physician's antitrust action against professional
review committee members that have revoked physician's privileges).
20. See 42 U.S.C. § 11101(1), (2) (Supp. 1988) (stating Congressional findings that need
to improve quality of medical care and need to restrict ability of-incompetent physicians to
move between states requires national legislation to remedy problems).
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legislation specifically regarding hospital professional review actions. 2' In
addition to the applicable statutory law, a court must examine anticompetitive actions of professional review committees in light of court-made
exceptions to federal antitrust laws. 22 Consequently, the court must apply
several different laws and legal theories to resolve a physician's antitrust
suit against the members of a professional review committee. 23 The necessary
judicial analysis is complicated and long, and would benefit greatly from
state legislation that consolidates the various applicable legal theories into
one statute. 24
A court that must resolve an antitrust suit a physician has brought
against the members of a professional review committee for wrongful
revocation of the physician's medical staff privileges must apply the first
of several legal theories to decide the defendants' inevitable motion for
summary judgment based on Title IV of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA).25 Congress enacted Title IV of the HCQIA
out of concern that the staggering damage awards plaintiff physicians had
received in antitrust actions from members of professional review committees
would discourage physicians from engaging in legitimate professional review
actions against incompetent physicians. 26 Through the protection the HCQIA

21. See H.R. REp. No. 903, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
& ADnmw. NEws 6384, 6385-86 (stating that Health Care Quality Improvement Act of
1986 protects helpless consumers from incompetent physicians' abuses); 132 CONG. REc. H9954,
H9963 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1986) (statement of Rep. Tauke) (stating that all representatives are
committed to ensuring that all citizens receive high quality health care services); infra notes
25-42 and accompanying text (describing Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986).
22. See infra notes 45-62 and accompanying text (describing state action doctrine).
23. See infra notes 25-100 and accompanying text (summarizing analysis necessary to
resolve physician's antitrust actions against professional review committee members that have
revoked physician's privileges).
24. See infra notes 25-100 and accompanying text (summarizing analysis necessary to
resolve physician's antitrust actions against professional review committee members that have
revoked physician's privileges); infra notes 201-10 and accompanying text (summarizing proposed state legislation).
25. Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (Supp. 1988) [hereinafter HCQIA]; infra notes 26-42
and accompanying text (discussing intent and requirements of HCQIA).
26. See 132 CoNG. REc. H9954, H9963 (dally ed. Oct. 14, 1986) (statement of Rep.
Tauke) (stating that threat of antitrust liability is major deterrent to physicians involved in
professional review actions); id. at H9963-64 (statement of Rep. Wyden) (noting that risk of
lawsuit against physicians participating in professional review actions prevents good, honest
physicians from participating in professional review actions). In enacting the HCQIA, members
of Congress specifically referred to a case in the United States District Court for the District
of Oregon where the jury awarded $1,950,000 against a professional review committee for a
wrongful revocation of a physician's medical staff privileges. See Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d
1498 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988) (detailing facts and holdings in Oregon
case that members of Congress referred to in debates on HCQIA); 132 CONG. REc. H9954,
H9960 (1986) (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1986) (statement of Rep. Edwards) (citing $2,000,000 jury
award made in Oregon case); James, Peer Review Among Doctors Receives Boost, Wall St.
J., Oct. 10, 1986, at 31, col. 3, reprinted in 132 CONG. REc. H9954, H9961-62 (daily ed. Oct.
CONG.
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accords to physicians engaged in professional review actions, Congress
attempted to encourage physicians to participate in the professional review
process, and thus maintain a high standard of quality for medical care in
the country. 27 To achieve this goal, the HCQIA provides that all participants
in a professional review action which meets certain statutory definitional

and substantive standards shall not be liable in damages under any federal,

state, or local law because of the action. 28 The HCQIA thereby provides

professional review
comprehensive protection for participants in legitimate
29
actions from all liability, including antitrust liability.
Although the HCQIA provides almost absolute immunity for members
of professional review committees engaging in legitimate professional review

actions, the statute does not provide immunity from liability for all professional review committees.3 0 In order for the actions of a particular professional review committee to be within the scope of HCQIA protection, the
14, 1986) (stating that, as result of large damage awards in Oregon antitrust action against
members of professional review committee, many physicians are refusing to participate in
professional review actions).
27. See H.R. REP. No. 903, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADmN. NEws 6384, 6384 (stating that purpose of HCQIA is to improve quality of
medical care by encouraging physicians to engage in professional review of other physicians).
Copngress cited five legislative findings that induced Congress to enact the HCQIA. 42 U.S.C.
§ 11101 (Supp. 1988). First, Congress found that the increasing occurrence of medical
malpractice and the need to improve the quality of medical care have become nationwide
problems requiring all states to act together. Id. § 11101(1). Second, Congress found a national
need to restrict the ability of incompetent physicians to move from state to state and thus
preventing other hospitals from discovering the physician's previous incompetent performance.
Id. § 11101(2). Third, Congress believed that effective professional peer review could remedy
these initial two problems. Id. § 11101(3). Fourth, Congress found that the threat of private
money damage liability under federal laws, including treble damage liability under federal
antitrust laws, unreasonably discouraged physicians from participating in effective professional
peer review. Id. § 11101(4). Finally, Congress found an overriding national need to protect
physicians engaging in effective professional peer review. Id. § 11101(5).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a) (Supp. 1988). In addition to establishing substantive and
procedural standards for professional review actions and providing immunity for committee
members that meet the statutory standards, the HCQIA requires the Secretary of Health and
Human Services (Secretary) to create a national system for reporting malpractice and disciplinary actions against physicians. Id. §§ 11131-11137. The statute authorizes the Secretary to
designate a public or private agency to collect, store, and disseminate the information that the
statute requires insurance companies and health care organizations to report. Id. § 11134(b).
The statute requires insurance companies that make payments in satisfaction of medical
malpractice claims to report the payments and the challenged acts to the designated agency.
Id. § 11131. The statute also requires state Boards of Medical Examiners, licensed hospitals,
health care service organizations, and professional physicians' societies to report disciplinary
actions to the designated agency. Id. §§ 11132-11133. Furthermore, the statute requires hospitals
to request from the designated agency information concerning physicians who apply for medical
staff privileges at the hospital and, every two years, information concerning physicians holding
medical staff privileges at the hospital. Id. § 11135(a).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a); see supra note 14 (describing various legal theories, other than
antitrust, which physicians may use against professional review committee members).
30. See infra notes 31-41 and accompanying text (describing limitations on immunity
provided in HCQIA).
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professional review committee must base its actions on a physician's competence or professional conduct rather than the committee members' anticompetitive business concerns.3 For example, the statute does not immunize
professional review decisions that are based on a physician's refusal to
associate with a particular professional organization.3 2 The statute also does
not immunize professional review decisions that are based on a physician's
fees or advertising. 3 Thus, the first of many issues on which the court must
hear evidence is whether the defendants based their action on improper
motives .34
Not only must the professional review committee base its action upon
a physician's competence or professional conduct to come within the scope
of HCQIA protection, but the HCQIA does not immunize professional
review committee members from liability unless the committee complies
with four substantive requirements. 35 First, the professional review committee
must act in the reasonable belief that the committee's action will further
the goal of providing quality health care.3 6 Second, the professional review
committee must not act until the committee makes a reasonable effort to
ascertain the facts surrounding the conduct under investigation.3 7 Third, the
committee must not act until the physician under investigation has received
adequate notice and hearing?38 Finally, the professional review committee

31. See 42 U.S.C. § 11152(9) (Supp. 1988) (defining permissible justifications for professional review committee action). According to the HCQIA, if a physician is under attack
for professional conduct and not for competence, the conduct at issue must affect adversely
or have the potential to affect adversely patients' health or welfare. Id.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 11151(9)(A) (Supp. 1988).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 11151(9)(B) (Supp. 1988). The HCQIA lists three additional impermissible grounds for professional review action. 42 U.S.C. § 11151(9) (Supp. 1988). First, a
professional review committee may not base an action on a physician's participation in prepaid
health plans, salaried employment, or any other manner of delivering health services. Id. §
11 151(9)(C). Second, a professional review committee may not base an action on a physician's
association with a member of a group of particular health care practitioners such as chiropractors. Id. § 11151(9)(D). Third, Congress included a "catchall" clause that prohibits
professional review action based on any matter that is unrelated to a physician's competence
or professional conduct. Id. § 11151(9)(E).
34. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text (illustrating improper motives for
professional review committee action under HCQIA).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a) (Supp. 1988); see infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text
(summarizing statutory requirements for professional review action).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a)(1) (Supp. 1988).
37. Id. § 11112(a)(2).

38. Id. § 11112(a)(3). The HCQIA provides an amplified description of the statutory
requirements for adequate notice and hearing. Id. § 11112(b). First, the committee must give
the physician notice stating that the committee has proposed to take a professional review
action against him and stating the reasons for the action. Id. § 11112(b)(1)(A)(i), (ii). The
notice also must state that the physician has the right to request a hearing on the committee's
proposed action. Id. § 11112(b)(1)(B)(i). Finally, the notice must summarize the rights the
physician has in the hearing. Id. § 11112(b)(1)(C). If the physician requests a hearing, the
committee must notify the physician of the time, place, and date of the hearing, and provide
a list of witnesses that may testify for the committee. Id. § 11112(b)(2). Furthermore, the
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reasonably must believe that the facts surrounding the allegations warrant
the committee's action.39 These substantive requirements assure that the
committee complies with due process requirements of notice and a fair
hearing. 40 Thus, by restricting the scope of protected professional review
actions and by enumerating substantive requirements that standardize committee procedures, Congress has limited immunity to participants in professional review actions that act in good faith. 4' However, Congress also has
placed a substantial burden on a plaintiff physician who, to survive a
motion for summary judgment and proceed to the merits of an antitrust
case, must demonstrate that the defendants based their action on improper
motives or failed to provide the plaintiff with adequate notice and a fair
42
hearing.
After reviewing the evidence from the plaintiff and the defendant on
the issue of HCQIA immunity, if a reviewing court determines that the
professional review committee satisfied the requirements of the HCQIA,
the court cannot impose liability on the members of the professional review
committee and must dismiss the suit. 43 However, if the professional review
committee's actions fail to fall within the scope of the HCQIA's protection,
the court next must consider the defendants' second inevitable summary
judgment motion alleging that the state action doctrine exempts the defen-

committee must conduct the hearing according to the standards set out in the HCQIA. Id. §
11112(b)(3). The HCQIA requires that a neutral arbitrator, hearing officer, or panel of
individuals conduct the hearing. Id. § 11112(b)(3)(A). During the hearing, the physician has a
right to have an attorney represent him; to have the committee make a record of the
proceedings; to call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses; to present relevant evidence; and
to submit a written statement at the close of the hearing. Id. § 11112(b)(3)(C). Finally, upon
the completion of the hearing, the physician has the right to receive from the person who
presided over the hearing a written recommendation that states the basis for the recommendation
and to receive from the hospital a written decision that states the basis for the hospital's
decision. Id. § 11112(b)(3)(D). The statute adds, however, that the professional review committee's failure to meet the standards outlined in § 11112(b) shall not, in itself, constitute a
failure to provide adequate notice and hearing procedures. Id. § 11112(b).
39. Id. § I1I12(a)(4). The HCQIA requires a court to presume that a professional review
action has met the requirement of § 11112(a) unless the plaintiff physician rebuts the presumption by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
40. See H.R. REP. No. 903, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADm.
NEws 6384, 6393 (stating that professional review committees can meet
HCQIA's due process requirements by following standards set in 42 U.S.C. § 11112(b)).
41. See H.R. REP. No. 903, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADmw. NEws 6384, 6391 (stating that HCQIA provides limited protection from
liability for persons conducting professional review actions based on competence or professional
conduct of individual physicians); 132 CONG. REc. H9954, H9957 (dally ed. Oct. 14, 1986)
(statement of Rep. Waxman) (stating that HCQIA does not protect illegitimate actions taken
under guise of furthering quality of health care).
42. See supra notes 25-41 and accompanying text (describing statutory requirements for
professional review action that plaintiff physician must prove to impose liability on defendants).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a) (Supp. 1988). Despite the broad immunity granted in the
HCQIA, a court may impose liability on the members of a professional review committee if
the court finds that the committee action violated any federal or state laws pertaining to civil
rights. Id.
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dants from antitrust liability." In the context of a federal antitrust suit, the
state action doctrine can provide immunity from antitrust liability to private
parties who act anticompetitively pursuant to a directive from a state
legislature. 45 In 1942 the United States Supreme Court first enunciated the
state action doctrine in Parker v. Brown46 when the Court ruled that
Congress did not intend the federal antitrust laws to restrict the anticompetitive conduct of a state acting as a sovereign. 47 The Court found that
Congress, in enacting the antitrust legislation, intended to focus the legislation on anticompetitive activities of private individuals and business or-

44. See Enders, supra note 13, at 339 (stating that defendants who successfully invoke
state action doctrine will cause dismissal of complaint); infra notes 45-62 and accompanying
text (discussing state action doctrine).
45. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97,
105 (1980) (stating that state action doctrine protects private parties if they act pursuant to
clearly articulated state policy and if state actively supervises conduct of private parties); supra
note 44 and accompanying text (stating that court must consider whether state action doctrine
exempts defendants from antitrust liability if court finds that professional review committee's
actions fail to fall within scope of HCQIA's protection).
46. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
47. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943) (finding that language and
legislative history of Sherman Act do not suggest congressional purpose to restrain state or
state's officers or agents from activities that state legislature directed). In Parker the United
State Supreme Court considered the validity, under the Sherman Act, of a prorate marketing
program that regulated the handling, distribution, and prices of raisins that California growers
had produced. Id. at 344. The State of California had instituted the program pursuant to the
California Agricultural Prorate Act (Act). Id. The stated purpose of the Act was to conserve
the state's agricultural wealth and to prevent economic waste in marketing the state's agricultural
products. Id. at 346. The Act authorized the California Director of Agriculture, upon
completion of a statutorily-defined public hearing process, to select a program committee from
among nominees that qualified producers in the defined production zone had chosen. Id. The
Act empowered the program committee, composed of private parties, to formulate a proration
marketing program for raisins produced in a production zone. Id. at 347. After the Agricultural
Prorate Advisory Commission had approved the program committee's proposed program, the
raisin producers in the affected zone voted on the proposed program. Id. If 65% of the
producers in the zone owning 51% of the acreage devoted to the production of the regulated
commodity approved the program, the Act required the Director of Agriculture to institute
the program. Id.
The Supreme Court in Parker noted that the challenged program would violate §§ 1 and
2 of the Sherman Act if private parties, acting without state authorization, had instituted the
program. Id. at 350. However, the Court found that the prorate program derived its authority
from the state legislature. Id. The Supreme Court cited federalist principles in its analysis of
the language and purpose of the act. Id. at 351. The Court stated that, in a dual system of
government, states are sovereign except as Congress constitutionally subtracts from the states'
authority. Id. Therefore, the Court noted that, as sovereigns, states may choose to displace
competition with regulation. Id. Upon examining the language of the Sherman Act, the Court
found that the Sherman Act does not imply a purpose to restrain state action or official action
that the state directs. Id. Furthermore, the Court found no suggestion of a purpose to restrain
state action in the Act's legislative history. Id. Consequently, the Court found that the Sherman
Act does not prohibit a state from anticompetitive action. Id. at 352. Accordingly, the Parker
Court held that the challenged prorate marketing program did not violate §§ I and 2 of the
Sherman Act. Id.
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ganizations, and not on states acting in their sovereign capacity. 4 In adopting

the doctrine, the Court allowed states to retain the power to act anticompetitively to promote values that the state ranks more highly than compe-

tition. 49 Since the inception of the doctrine, the Court has expanded the

state action doctrine to protect anticompetitive actions not only of the state
legislature but also actions of the state judiciary,

governments,51

0

actions of municipal

and actions of state administrative agencies.5 2
In some situations the state action doctrine permits states to authorize
private individuals to enact anticompetitive regulations without being subject

to antitrust laws. 53 State legislatures may require physician members of

hospital medical staffs to regulate themselves by forming professional review
committees to improve the quality of health care in the state.5 4 The state

action doctrine will immunize the anticompetitive actions of the hospital as
if the state itself was engaging in the conduct.5 5 For the authorized private
individuals to enact anticompetitive regulations without subjecting themselves to antitrust penalties, however, the state must ensure that the parties'
actions further legitimate government concerns for public health and welfare

48. See Parker, 317 U.S. at 351 (stating that legislative history of Sherman Act does not
suggest purpose to restrain action of state).
49. See Comment, Patrick v. Burget: The State Action Doctrine and Bad Faith Peer
Review, 74 VA. L. Rav. 609, 620 (1988) (stating that, through state action doctrine, Court
allowed states to act anticompetitively to promote values that state ranks more highly than
values associated with competition).
50. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 362 (1977) (finding that state bar rule
that Arizona Supreme Court made satisfied both requirements of state action doctrine).
51. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 47 (1985) (upholding
municipality's regulation of sewage services pursuant to clearly articulated state policy to
displace competition without requiring showing of active state supervision). Since the Hallie
decision, Congress explicitly has exempted from antitrust liability all local governments and
local government officials and employees acting in an official capacity. 15 U.S.C. § 35 (Supp.
1989).
52. See New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 109 (1978)
(ruling that state agency's decisions to regulate establishment of new automobile dealerships
constituted state action).
53. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 346-47 (1943) (describing state agricultural
program in which state authorized private raisin producers, packers, and handlers to formulate
proration marketing program for raisins); Llewellyn v. Crothers, 765 F.2d 769, 772 (9th Cir.
1985) (describing state workers' compensation program in which state authorized two medical
doctors to promulgate reasonable rates employers should pay for medical services).
54. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 32128 (West Supp. 1989) (requiring hospital
rules to provide that medical staff review work that physicians performed in hospital); IDAHO
CODE § 39-1392f (Supp. 1988) (providing that hospitals shall require medical staffs to organize
to review professional practices of members of medical staff); IND. CODE § 34-4-12.6-1 (1986)
(requiring hospitals to establish professional review committees); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §
2805-j.l(a) (McKinney Supp. 1989) (requiring hospitals to establish quality assurance committees
to review services rendered in hospital to improve quality of medical care of patients); OR.
Ra,. STAT. § 44.055(3)(d) (1987) (requiring medical staff to review professional practices of
facility).
55. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text (discussing development of and rationale
behind judicially-created state action doctrine).
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56
and do not further the parties' private anticompetitive motives.
The United States Supreme Court has articulated a two-pronged test
for courts to use to determine whether a particular private party purporting
to act anticompetitively pursuant to state authorization satisfies the require-7
ments for immunity from antitrust liability under the state action doctrine.
First, the state legislature must have articulated clearly and affirmatively
the state's intent to displace normal principles of free competition with the
challenged private action that restrains competitive commerce.58 Courts may

find a state's expression of intent if a relevant statute explicitly empowers
a private party to act in an anticompetitive manner or if the purpose of
the private individual's action is a purpose for which the legislature empowered the private individual to act.5 9 Second, the state actively must supervise
those private individuals that the state has designated to displace free
competition.60 The active supervision requirement requires the state to
56. See Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658, 1663 (1988) (stating that court designed active
supervision requirement of state action doctrine to ensure that state action doctrine shelters
only anticompetitive acts of private parties that further state policies).
57. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Mideal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97,
105 (1980) (enunciating two-pronged test to determine whether state action doctrine immunizes
anticompetitive conduct from antitrust liability). In Midcal the United States Supreme Court
considered whether the state action doctrine immunized California's resale price maintenance
and price posting statutes for the wholesale wine trade from antitrust liability. Id. at 99. The
California statute required all wholesalers in a specified area to adhere to the wine prices that
a single producer set. Id. at 99-100, 103. The Court enunciated a two-part test to determine
whether the Parker state action doctrine immunized private anticompetitive conduct from
antitrust liability. Id. at 105. First, the state must articulate clearly and express affirmatively
that the challenged restraint is state policy. Id. Second, the state must actively supervise the
policy. Id. The Midcal Court found that the California wine pricing system satisfied the first
standard. Id. However, in applying the second standard to the California program, the Court
found that the state simply authorized price setting and enforced prices private parties have
set without reviewing the reasonableness of the price schedules or engaging in any pointed
reexamination of the program. Id. at 105-06. Consequently, the Midal Court found that the
California program failed to satisfy the second standard. Id. at 105. The Court therefore
found that the state action doctrine did not immunize program participants from antitrust
liability. Id.
58. Id.

59. See I P.
PRINCPLES AND

AREEDA &

TIRm

D.

TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST

APPLICATION

214d at 89 (1978) [hereinafter

AREEDA

& TURNER]

(stating that courts can find state's expression of intent stated explicitly in words of relevant
statute, or courts can imply state's intent to displace competition). In determining whether a
state legislature has implied an intent to displace federal antitrust law, courts consider the
rationale for state involvement, the kinds of factors the agency considers in arriving at an
administrative decision, customs, and a presumption that competition serves the state's interests
unless the state has fairly clearly expressed a different view. See id. 214a, at 81 (discussing
factors courts may use in determining whether state legislature has implied intent to displace
federal antitrust laws).
60. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980). The state action doctrine's requirement that states actively supervise parties whom the
state has designated to regulate competition substitutes for the economic restraints of the
competitive marketplace. See AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 59, 213a, at 73 (stating that
active supervision requirement of state action doctrine substitutes for restraints of competitive
marketplace).
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exercise ultimate control over the anticompetitive conduct of the private
parties. 61 If the state both intends to allow and supervises the private
individuals' action, the private actors qualify for immunity from antitrust
62
liability under the state action doctrine.
To rule on a professional review committee's motion to dismiss based
upon the state action doctrine, a court must review extensive evidence of
the state's purpose and the extent of state supervision. 63 At this point, the
volume of evidence the court already has reviewed probably exceeds the
volume of evidence necessary to decide the merits of the plaintiff physician's
antitrust action itself.64 However, if the court determines that the members
of the professional review committee are not immune from liability under
the state action doctrine, the court must proceed to analyze the merits of
the plaintiff physician's antitrust claims. 65 While the proof requirements for
this portion of the plaintiff's claim do not differ from other antitrust claims,
the nature of the evidence that a physician must produce to demonstrate
his injury and right to recovery is inherently speculative and thus very
difficult and time-consuming to prove. 6

61. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf., Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 51
(1985) (noting that state public service commissions have and exercise ultimate authority and
control over intrastate rates); infra notes 155-61 and accompanying text (summarizing Supreme
Court's state action doctrine analysis in Patrick).
62. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. at
105 (stating that parties who satisfy two-pronged state action test immune from antitrust
liability). Under the state action doctrine, the private actors retain their immune status even
if the motives underlying the action were bad faith motives. See Llewellyn v. Crothers, 765
F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that availability of state action doctrine does not depend
on subjective motivations of individual actors but on satisfaction of doctrine's objective
requirements). For example, often the parties that the state has chosen to regulate an
occupational area also are involved in the occupation that they regulate, and thus the private
parties have ulterior motives in regulating their competition in a way that restrains the
competition. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 346-47 (1943) (describing state agricultural
program in which state authorized private raisin producers, packers, and handlers to formulate
proration marketing program for raisins); Llewellyn, 765 F.2d at 771-72 (describing state
workers' compensation program in which state authorized two medical doctors to promulgate
reasonable rates employers should pay for medical services). However, once a court determines
that the private actors qualify for state action immunity, the court is not to inquire into the
members' underlying motives. Id. at 774. According to the Llewellyn Court, the possibility
that courts could intrude upon internal state affairs to determine whether the individual actors
acted in good faith is contrary to the principles of federalism and state sovereignty underlying
the state action doctrine. Id.
63. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text (summarizing requirements of state
action doctrine).
64. Compare supra notes 25-62 and accompanying text (summarizing judicial analysis
under HCQIA and state action doctrine) with infra notes 73-100 and accompanying text
(summarizing judicial analysis under federal antitrust laws).
65. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790-92 (1975) (stating that, where
defendants fail to qualify for immunity under state action doctrine, their action is within reach
of Sherman Act).
66. See infra notes 73-100 and accompanying text (discussing elements of antitrust case
plaintiff physician must prove to succeed on antitrust claim).
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The Sherman Antitrust Act (Sherman Act) is the basis of federal
antitrust law. 67 Congress enacted the Sherman Act in 1890 to restrict the
growth of corporations occurring during the period of industrial expansion
following the Civil War.6 8 Through the Sherman Act, Congress expressed
its intent to encourage the competitive nature of the United States' economy
by prohibiting unreasonable restraints on trade.6 9 Accordingly, section 1 of
the Sherman Act prohibits all combinations, contracts, or conspiracies that
restrain interstate commerce.7 0 Similarly, section 2 of the Sherman Act
prohibits all persons from monopolizing any portion of interstate commerce. 71 The aim of section 1 of the Sherman Act is to prohibit several
persons or corporations from working together to suppress competition or
to exclude persons or corporations from competing in the same market,
while the aim of section 2 of the Sherman Act is to prohibit a single entity
from controlling or dominating a market, thus rendering the market non72
competitive.

67. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1985).
68. See Note, Application of the Antitrust Laws to Anticompetitive Activities by Physicians, 30 RUTGERS L. REv. 991, 991 n.2 (1977) (stating that Congress enacted Sherman Act
in 1890 in response to public opposition of industrial monopolies).
69. See 21 CONG. REc. 52455, S2457 (daily ed. Mar 21, 1890) (statement of Sen.
Sherman) (stating that antitrust bill does not affect combinations in aid of production where
free and fair competition exists).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1985); see 21 CONG. REc. S2455, 2456 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1890)
(statement of Sen. Sherman) (stating that § I provides federal courts jurisdiction to restrain
and control combinations that interfere injuriously with foreign and interstate commerce).
Although § 1 of the Sherman Act expressly prohibits all combinations or conspiracies that
restrain trade, the Supreme Court has interpreted § 1 to prohibit only those combinations or
conspiracies that unreasonably restrain trade. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S.
1, 59-60 (1911) (stating that § 1 prohibits all contracts, combinations, and conspiracies that
unduly restrain interstate and foreign commerce). Consequently, most alleged antitrust violations require courts to determine if the restraint on trade is unreasonable by weighing the
procompetitive reasons for the restraint against the anticompetitive effect. See Note, Application
of the Antitrust Laws to Anticompetitive Activities by Physicians, 30 RUTGERs L. REv. 991,
1003-05 (1977) (explaining per se violations and violations that require rule of reason analysis);
Note, Denying HospitalPrivileges to Non-Physicians:Does Quality of Care Justify a Potential
Restraint of Trade?, 19 IND. L. REv. 1219, 1220 (1986) (explaining that, where defendants
have not committed per se antitrust violation, court must weigh procompetitive reasons for
restraint against anticompetitive effect).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1985). Section 7 of the Sherman Antitrust Act defines "person" to
include corporations as well as individuals. Id. § 7.
72. See Six Twenty-Nine Productions, Inc. v. Rollins Telecasting, Inc., 365 F.2d 478,
484 (5th Cir. 1966) (stating that § 2 fills gap in § I by allowing one business entity to violate
§ 2, while § 1 requires at least two independent business entities for violation). The Supreme
Court has stated that Congress designed § 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act to supplement § 1
and to ensure that no anticompetitive act could frustrate or evade § 1. Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911). Section 2 therefore prohibits all attempts to restrain
trade, even acts that do not fall under § 1. Id. at 61.
To enforce the prohibitions against conspiracies or monopolies that restrain trade, the
Sherman Act provides that all persons who violate either § I or § 2 of the Sherman Act are
guilty of a felony and subject to monetary penalties and incarceration. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2
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Before a court will consider a physician's claim that the actions of a

professional review committee violate the Sherman Act, the physician must
establish that he has standing to seek relief to survive a third motion for

summary judgment. 73 To establish standing to seek relief under the Sherman

Act, the physician must show that he has a right to either injunctive relief 74

or treble damages. 7 To establish that the physician has standing to receive
injunctive relief, the physician must demonstrate that an impending violation

of antitrust laws or an existing violation likely to continue or recur threatens
significant injury to the physician. 76 To establish that the physician has

standing to receive treble damages, the physician must demonstrate a causal
relationship between the defendants' unlawful conduct and the physician's
economic injury.77 In addition, before the court can hear the substance of
the plaintiff's antitrust claims, the physician must define a specific relevant
product market, such as the market for orthopedic surgical services, and 7a
specific relevant geographic market, such as a town or portion of a county.

(1985). In addition to criminal sanctions, the Sherman Act provides that those who violate the

Act are civilly liable in damages to the parties the violators' anticompetitive conduct injured.
Id. at § 15(a). The Sherman Act requires the court to treble automatically the damages that
a plaintiff receives from defendants who have violated the Sherman Act. Id. The Sherman
Act also requires a court to award a successful plaintiff reasonable attorney's fees and other
litigation expenses. Id. Moreover, a court has the discretion to award the successful plaintiff
interest on the actual damages. Id. The possibility of treble damages has important ramifications
for members of professional review committees who lose an antitrust action that a physician
has brought against the committee that revoked his medical staff privileges. See supra notes
26-27 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' desire, in enacting HCQIA, to protect
physicians who participate in professional review actions from antitrust liability).
Congress first provided a treble damages remedy for persons that an antitrust violation
has injured in § 7 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434

U.S. 308, 311 (1978). In 1914 Congress reenacted § 7 without substantial change as § 4 of the
Clayton Act (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1985)). Id. The Supreme Court has stated that the
treble damages remedy provided in § 4 of the Clayton Act serves two purposes. Pfizer, 434

U.S. at 314. First, the threat of treble damages deters antitrust violators and deprives violators
of "the fruits of their illegality." Id. Second, treble damages compensate the victims of
antitrust violations for their injuries. Id.; see 21 CONG. REc. S3145, S3146-48 (daily ed. Apr.
8, 1890) (statements of Sen. Reagan and Sen. George) (explaining that, unless antitrust plaintiffs
can recover treble damages, damages award will be inconsequential to large, wealthy business
combinations).
73. See Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 805-06 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating requirements
for antitrust plaintiff to establish that plaintiff has right to relief), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1060
(1985); infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text (describing elements antitrust plaintiff must
show to establish right to seek relief).
74. Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1985).
75. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1985).
76. See Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 829 (3d Cir. 1984) (describing how plaintiff
physician establishes standing to receive injunctive relief for antitrust violation), cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1060 (1985).

77. See id. at 805 (discussing how plaintiff physician establishes standing to receive treble
damages for antitrust violation).
78. See Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 825 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating that, to define
relevant market for § 2 claim, court must define both product market and geographic market),
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Consequently, the physician must present, the defendants must rebut, and
the court must review a substantial amount of evidence to determine whether
the physician has satisfied the standing requirements for continuing with
79
his antitrust claims.
If the court determines that the plaintiff has a right to seek relief and
has properly defined the relevant markets, the physician must establish a
prima facie case of conspiracy under section 1 of the Sherman Act or
monopoly under section 2.80 If the physician has alleged a conspiracy in
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, the physician must establish
8
three elements to survive yet a fourth motion for summary judgment. '
First, the physician must establish that the individual defendants acted as
part of a contract, combination, or conspiracy.8 2 In the context of a hospital
professional review committee, a physician may satisfy the conspiracy element with a showing that the individual members of the professional review
committee conspired among themselves to revoke another physician's medical staff privileges to decrease the number of physicians competing for
patients. 3 In some cases, however, because most hospital governing boards

cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1060 (1985); Dolan & Ralston, supra note 6, at 741 (stating that, under
rule of reason analysis of § I claim, plaintiff must show that defendants wield substantial
economic power in relevant market); infra note 133 (describing how plaintiff physician Patrick
alleged relevant product and geographic markets in Patrick). The plaintiff physician in an
antitrust action must define the relevant product or services market and the relevant geographic
market. Enders, supra note 13, at 360. The relevant product or services market includes all
products or services that consumers perceive as reasonable substitutes for each other. Pontius
v. Children's Hosp., 552 F. Supp. 1352, 1366 (W.D. Pa. 1982). The relevant geographic
market includes the geographic area of effective competition that the defendant encounters
when the defendant offers the designated product or service to the consumer. Id.; see infra
note 133 (describing how plaintiff in Patrick defined relevant product and geographic markets).
79. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text (explaining that, before court can
proceed with plaintiff's antitrust action, physician must prove standing to seek relief and must
define relevant market).
80. See Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 805 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating that plaintiff
must demonstrate that defendants have violated antitrust laws), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1060
(1985).
81. See id. at 812 (listing elements plaintiff must show to allege violation of § 1 of
Sherman Act).
82. See id. at 813 (stating that, to allege violation of § 1 of Sherman Act, physician
must show that individual defendants acted as part of contract, combination, or conspiracy).
83. See Enders, supra note 13, at 350 (stating that staff privileges case may involve
allegation that individual members of hospital's existing medical staff conspired among themselves to revoke competing physician's medical staff privileges); Weiss v. York Hosp., 745
F.2d 786, 814 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that medical staff satisfies, as matter of law, conspiracy
requirement of § 1 of Sherman Act), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1060 (1985). In Weiss v. York
Hospitalthe United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit considered whether individual
members of a medical staff could constitute a conspiracy without an allegation that the hospital
was a coconspirator. Id. at 814-17. The Third Circuit stated that each physician member of a
medical staff practices medicine in an individual capacity, as an independent practitioner in
competition with other physicians in the area. Id. at 815. Consequently, each member of the
medical staff has an economic interest separate from and in competition with the interests of
other medical staff members. Id. The Third Circuit held, therefore, that as a matter law, the
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have reserved the authority to revoke medical staff privileges upon the
professional review committee's recommendation, the plaintiff physician
must include the hospital, through its governing board, as an alleged
coconspirator. 4 Proving the existence of a conspiracy is especially difficult
for physicians because the physicians must prove both that the defendants
acted as separate entities and that the defendants acted pursuant to an
agreement.8 5 Second, the physician alleging a section 1 violation must
establish that the defendants' conduct in revoking the physician's medical
staff privileges imposed an unreasonable restraint on trade by wrongly
excluding the physician from the local competitive market for physicians'
services.8 6 The physician may allege that the committee's decision to revoke
the physician's medical staff privileges unreasonably restricts competition in
the local medical services market because the committee members, in their
capacities as private practitioners, agreed among themselves not to deal with
a certain physician in the hospital.8 7 Third, the physician must allege that

medical staff is a combination of individual physicians, and any action that the medical staff
takes can satisfy the contract, combination, or conspiracy requirement of § 1 of the Sherman
Act. Id. at 814; see also Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 843 F.2d 139, 144 n.5 (3d Cir. 1988) (stating
that joint action that medical staff took satisfied § I conspiracy requirement).
84. See Enders, supra note 13, at 351-52 (stating that plaintiff physician must include
hospital as alleged coconspirator). Courts deciding antitrust cases that physicians have brought
against the members of the professional review committee and the members of the governing
board do not accept uniformly allegations that the hospital governing board conspired with
the members of the medical staff. Compare Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 817 (3d Cir.
1984) (holding that hospital could not, as matter of law, conspire with medical staff), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1060 (1985) with Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842, 907 (O.D.Pa.
1981) (stating that members of medical staff, because they have independent, personal stake
in hospital's action to deny application for privileges, can conspire with hospital corporation).
85. See Enders, supra note 13, at 351-52 (discussing what plaintiff physician must show
to allege violation of § 1 of Sherman Act). Plaintiffs who allege that the defendants have
combined or conspired in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act must prove that two or more
distinct entities agreed to take action against the plaintiff. See id. (stating that, to allege
violation of § I of Sherman Act, plaintiff must show that at least two entities agreed to take
action against plaintiff); supra note 72 and accompanying text (explaining that violation of §
1 requires at least two parties). Furthermore, to present sufficient evidence to take the conspiracy
issue to the jury, the plaintiff must present evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that
the multiple defendants acted independently. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp.,
465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984) (stating that plaintiff must present evidence excluding possibility that
multiple defendants acted independently).
86. See Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 812 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating that physician
alleging § I violation must establish that defendants' conduct imposed unreasonable restraint
on trade), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1060 (1985); 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1985) (invalidating combinations
that restrain trade among states).
87. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 511 (1940) (stating that restraint of
trade requirement of § 1 of Sherman Act necessitates showing of restriction on competition
with accompanying detrimental effect on consumers); Enders, supra note 13, at 354 (stating
that horizontal group boycott may arise if physicians, in their individual capacities as private
practitioners, agree among themselves not to deal with individual physician in .hospital). In
antitrust actions that physicians have brought against professional review committee members,
the court will evaluate the defendants' allegedIy anticompetitive conduct using rule of reason
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the defendants' conduct substantially affects interstate commerce. 88 To es-

tablish that a professional review committee's action substantially affects
interstate commerce, physicians have alleged a variety of far-reaching and
fairly speculative effects on commerce.8 9 For example, physicians have

analysis. See Kissam, supra note 7, at 647 (noting that courts apply rule df reason balancing
approach to antitrust cases involving medical professionals). Under rule of reason analysis,
the defendants successfully may defend their anticompetitive action by establishing legitimate
reasons for their action. Id. Thus, if the defendant members of the professional review
committee justify a decision to revoke a physician's medical staff privileges with motives that
include incompetence or professional conduct, the defendants insulate themselves from antitrust
liability under § 1. See Pontius v. Children's Hosp., 552 F. Supp. 1352, 1372 (W.D. Pa. 1982)
(stating that Sherman Act does not prevent hospital from revoking medical staff privileges of
incompetent physician); Williams v. Kleaveland, 534 F. Supp. 912, 917 (W.D. Mich. 1981)
(stating that hospitals may revoke physician's medical staff privileges for misconduct); Enders,
supra note 13, at 357-58 (stating that, in antitrust suit, defendants may claim action justified
on basis of maintaining or improving overall quality of medical care delivered to patients).
88. See Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 812 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating that physician
must allege that defendants' conduct substantially affects interstate commerce), cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1060 (1985); 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1985) (invalidating combinations in restraint of trade
that affect commerce among states). To satisfy the interstate commerce requirement of § 1,
the plaintiff physician must allege that the effects of the alleged violation will impact interstate
commerce, not that the sum total of defendants' activities impact interstate commerce. Kissam,
supra note 7, at 632-33 (explaining that physician must state that effects of alleged antitrust
violation will impact interstate commerce); Doe v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 788 F.2d 411, 417 (7th
Cir. 1986) (stating that plaintiff must allege that defendants' activities that allegedly violate §
1 of Sherman Act will have not insubstantial effect on interstate commerce).
89. See Enders, supra note 13, at 332-33 (discussing ways physicians may allege effect
on interstate commerce). The plaintiff can satisfy the interstate commerce requirement of § I
of the Sherman Act in one of two ways. See Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 824 (3d
Cir. 1984) (stating ways in which plaintiff can satisfy Sherman Act's interstate commerce
requirement), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1060 (1985); Kissam, supra.note 7, at 628 (same). First,
the physician may show that the defendants' allegedly anticompetitive conduct occurred within
the flow of interstate commerce. See Kissam, supra note 7, at 628 (stating ways in which
plaintiff can satisfy Sherman Act's interstate commerce requirement). Because most physicians
and hospitals operate in a purely local market, however, this alternative is difficult for
complaining physicians to satisfy. See id. at 628-29 (stating ways in which plaintiff can satisfy
Sherman Act's interstate commerce requirement). Consequently, the Supreme Court enunciated
an alternative method of alleging an effect on interstate commerce in Hospital Building Co.
v. Trustees of Rex Hospital. See id. at 628 (summarizing Rex Hospital). In Rex Hospital the
United States Supreme Court addressed an antitrust suit that a corporation operating a 49bed proprietary hospital brought against a private hospital, two of the hospital's officers, and
a health planning officer. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740
(1976). The plaintiff's complaint alleged that the defendants conspired to block the plaintiff
hospital's planned relocation and expansion. Id. The Supreme Court noted that the plaintiff's
complaint alleged that the defendants' alleged anticompetitive conduct would affect the amount
of purchases plaintiff made from out-of-state suppliers. Id. at 744. In addition, the plaintiff
alleged that the defendants' conduct would affect the amount of revenues the plaintiff received
from out-of-state insurance companies. Id. The Supreme Court found that these alleged effects
on interstate commerce, in combination with effects on the amount of money the plaintiff
would pay to its out-of-state parent corporation and the effect on the multi-million dollar
financing largely from out-of-state institutions, sufficiently established a substantial effect on
interstate commerce under the Sherman Act. Id. The Rex Hospital alternative allows a physician
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forecasted monetary losses the hospital will suffer due to lost out-of-state
patients; loss of revenues from out-of-state insurance companies, Medicare,
and Medicaid; and monetary losses to out-of-state medical supply companies
that will suffer because of the loss of the physician's patronage. ° Although
the magnitude of the effect on interstate commerce that the Sherman Act
requires remains unclear, a physician operating in even a purely local market
generally can withstand a summary judgment motion if the physician alleges
basic effects on interstate commerce. 91
In addition to or as an alternative to filing an antitrust action under
section 1 of the Sherman Act, a physician may file an action against a
professional review committee as a monopolistic entity under section 2 of
the Sherman Act. 92 If a physician has alleged a violation of section 2, the
physician must establish that the defendant monopolized interstate commerce
by controlling prices in a certain market or excluding or restricting competition from a certain market. 93 To survive summary judgment in a section
2 suit, the statute requires the physician to allege two elements.9 4 First, the
physician must show that the professional review committee exercised undue

to show that the defendants' conduct substantially affects interstate commerce, instead of
requiring a physician to allege that the defendants' conduct occurred within the flow of
interstate commerce. See id. (stating that physician may allege substantial effect on interstate
commerce to meet Sherman Act's interstate commerce allegation requirements).
90. See Enders, supra note 13, at 337-38 (listing means by which plaintiff physicians
have met Sherman Act's interstate commerce requirement); infra note 133 (describing how
plaintiff physician Patrick alleged substantial effect on interstate commerce in Patrick).
91. Compare Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 843 F.2d 139, 144 n.5 (3d Cir. 1988) (stating that
plaintiff's allegations that hospital treats out-of-state patients, purchases medical supplies from
out-of-state suppliers, and receives money from out-of-state sources satisfies interstate commerce
requirement) and Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 824-25 (3d Cir. 1984) (same), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1060 (1985) and Pontius v. Children's Hosp., 552 F. Supp. 1352, 1361 (W.D.
Pa. 1982) (stating that modem medical practice generally involves sufficient interstate commerce
to satisfy § 1 of Sherman Act) with Hayden v. Bracy, 744 F.2d 1338, 1342-43 (8th Cir. 1984)
(holding that plaintiff failed to establish sufficient effect on interstate commerce with allegations
that defendants' conduct would raise prices of out-of-state patients and insurance companies)
and Doe v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 788 F.2d 411, 417 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that plaintiff failed
to establish sufficient effect on interstate commerce by alleging that defendants' conduct would
lessen purchase of medicine and supplies that travel in interstate commerce, and would affect
payment of medical bills through out-of-state private and governmental insurance programs,
out-of-state patients, and general sharing of information and medical training across state
lines).
92. See Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498, 1504 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that plaintiff
physician filed action against hospital and professional review committee for violations of §§
1 and 2 of Sherman Act), rev'd on other grounds, 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988); Weiss v. York
Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 799 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating that plaintiff physician filed action against
hospital, medical staff, and professional review committee for violations of §§ 1 and 2 of
Sherman Act), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1060 (1985).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1985); see Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 827 (3d Cir. 1984)
(defining monopoly power as ability to control price in or to exclude or restrict competition
from relevant geographic market), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1060 (1985).
94. See Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 825 (3d Cir. 1984) (listing elements plaintiff
must show to establish violation of § 2 of Sherman Act), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1060 (1985).

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:961

control over the relevant market. 95 Often the defendant will attempt to

demonstrate that the physician has other sources of employment within the
relevant product market and relevant geographic market. 96 If the defendant
successfully establishes that the plaintiff had reasonable alternative employ-

ment options in the relevant market, which is often fairly easy in localities
with more than one hospital, a court is unlikely to find a monopoly.9 7 The
second element that a plaintiff physician must allege to survive summary
judgment in a section 2 suit is that the defendant professional review

committee willfully acquired or maintained monopolistic power. 9s If the
defendants acquired or maintained a superior market position because of
normal growth or development resulting from superior products, business
acumen, or historical accident, the physician will fail on the section 2
claim. 99 Therefore, if the defendant committee members show that they

acquired a large share of the medical services market because of superior
medical or business skills, the defendants will prevail against the plaintiff
1
on the section 2 claim.

°

Courts resolving antitrust cases against members of professional review
committees must digest voluminous amounts of evidence regarding the
committee members' motives and conduct in the professional review action,' 0 1 the state statutory scheme, 1°2 and the elements of federal antitrust
violations. 0 3 State legislative action can simplify the present complex legal

analysis, protect competent physicians from abusive professional review
actions, and better protect the members of professional review committees

95. See id. (stating that plaintiff must establish that defendant possessed monopoly power
in relevant market); supra note 78 (defining relevant markets). In assessing whether the
defendant in an antitrust suit has monopoly over the relevant markets, courts primarily consider
defendant's market share. Weiss, 745 F.2d at 827. Consequently, courts considering an antitrust
action under § 2 of the Sherman Act must define the relevant markets. See id. at 825 (stating
that, to define relevant market for § 2 claim, court must define both product market and
geographic market).
96. See Pontius v. Children's Hosp., 552 F. Supp. 1352, 1366 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (stating
that defendant has power over market if defendant can exclude competition from particular
territory).
97. See Weiss, 745 F.2d at 826 n.68 (stating that, in typical antitrust action, defendant
attempts to prove widest possible relevant market and plaintiff attempts to prove narrowest
possible relevant market because defendant has lower percentage of market in large market).
98. See id. at 827 (listing elements plaintiff must show to establish violation of § 2 of
Sherman Act).
99. See id. at 825 (distinguishing between monopoly power acquired and maintained
willfully and monopoly power acquired and maintained unintentionally); Dolan & Ralston,
supra note 6, at 767 (same).
100. See Weiss at 825 (distinguishing between monopoly power acquired and maintained
willfully and market dominance gained through means not intended to acquire monopoly
control).
101. See supra notes 31-42 and accompanying text (summarizing standards committee
members must meet to qualify for immunity under HCQIA).
102. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text (summarizing judicial analysis under
state action doctrine).
103. See supra notes 73-100 and accompanying text (summarizing antitrust analysis).
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from liability.' ° ' A 1988 United States Supreme Court decision illustrates
the present confused status of antitrust law in the context of professional
review actions as well as the need better to protect both the members of
professional review committees and the physicians whose privileges the
committee has challenged. 0 5 In Patrick v. Burget'06 the plaintiff, an Oregon
physician, filed an antitrust suit in the United State District Court for the
District of Oregon against the members of a professional review committee
that had revoked the physician's hospital privileges. 07 The plaintiff, Patrick,
was a surgeon trained in general and vascular surgery. 0 In 1972 Patrick
had joined the Astoria Clinic (Clinic), a partnership of local physicians,
and had received medical staff privileges at Columbia Memorial Hospital
(Hospital) in connection with his clinical practice. ' 9 Columbia Memorial
Hospital is the sole hospital in Astoria, Oregon, a town of 10,000 people." 0
All the members of the Hospital's professional review committee also were
partners in the Astoria Clinic."' In 1973, when Patrick's initial contract
with the Clinic expired, the Clinic partners asked Patrick to become a
partner." 2 Patrick refused the offer to join the Clinic partnership because
Patrick felt that the Clinic had not compensated Patrick adequately in
I 13
proportion to the amount of income Patrick generated for the Clinic.
Consequently, Patrick chose to open an independent medical practice in
4
Astoria in 1975."
From the time Patrick left the Clinic, the Clinic doctors reacted negatively to Patrick's establishment of an independent practice." 5 According to
the Patrick circuit court, the Clinic doctors referred virtually no patients to
Patrick for surgery, even during the time that the Clinic had no general
surgeon on staff."16 In addition, if Patrick treated a Clinic patient, Clinic
doctors reacted angrily."17 On several occasions Clinic doctors accused
Patrick of stealing Clinic patients."' Ironically, while Clinic doctors accused
104. See infra notes 201-10 and accompanying text (explaining proposed state legislation).
105. See infra notes 107-63 and accompanying text (examining facts and court decisions
in Patrick v. Burget).
106. 800 F.2d 1498 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988).
107. Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498, 1504 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 108
S. Ct. 1658 (1988).
108. Id. at 1502. As a vascular surgeon, the plaintiff in Patrick was a physician trained
to perform surgery on blood vessels. See TABER's CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DIcONARY (15th ed.
1985), reprintedin AM. JuR. 3d Proof of Facts 1838 (1985) (defining "vascular").
109. Patrick, 800 F.2d at 1502.
110. Id.

111. Id. During the relevant time period in Patrick, the majority of the Hospital medical
staff were employees or partners of the Clinic. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. Although the Ninth Circuit in Patrick did not explicitly note the fact, Patrick
retained his medical staff privileges at the Hospital after Patrick left the Clinic. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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Patrick of patient-theft, Clinic doctors attempted to convert Patrick's patients into Clinic patients and to prevent new patients from seeing Patrick." 9
This practice was especially noticeable in the pattern of treatment of

emergency room patients.

20

Specifically, patients would come to the emer-

gency room, ask for Patrick, and the emergency room staff would respond
that Patrick was unavailable.' 2' Later, the patients discovered that Patrick
was available and that the emergency room staff had made no effort to

contact Patrick.'2 Clinic doctors consistently refused to care for Patrick's
patients in return for similar favors from Patrick, yet at the same time
Clinic doctors criticized Patrick repeatedly for his failure to get adequate
23
back-up coverage.
In 1981 the Hospital medical staff initiated proceedings to terminate
Patrick's medical staff privileges. 24 The Executive Committee (Committee),

which was responsible for reviewing claims of professional misconduct
against Hospital physicians, 25 voted to recommend that the Hospital terminate Patrick's medical staff privileges because the Committee found that
Patrick's care of patients fell below hospital standards. 26 The Committee
allowed Patrick a hearing at which the Hospital presented the case against
Patrick, and Patrick presented his defenses to the Hospital's allegations. 27
The Committee selected nine cases to use as evidence against Patrick from

a period during which Patrick had performed 2,000-2,500 surgeries.

28

Al-

119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. The Patrick circuit court found that the strained relations between Patrick and
the Clinic doctors erupted into serious confrontations in the fail of 1979. Id. at 1503. Finally,
the members of the Hospital's medical staff requested the Board of Medical Examiners (the
Board), the state agency charged with licensing physicians and disciplining licensed physicians,
to take disciplinary action against Patrick. Id.; see OR. R~v. STAT. § 677.265 (1987) (granting
licensing powers to Board of Medical Examiners). The Hospital staff executive committee
referred the charts from 15 cases that the Hospital claimed Patrick had handled poorly to the
Oregon Board of Medical Examiners. Patrick, 800 F.2d at 1503. Patrick had not been the
treating doctor in some of the cases. Id. After the Board had investigated the 15 cases, the
Board sent a letter of reprimand to Patrick. Id. However, the Board retracted the letter when
Patrick petitioned for judicial review of the Board's proceedings. Id.
124. Id. at 1504.
125. Amended Pre-Trial Order, reprinted in Joint Appendix for the Supreme Court 13,
15-16, Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988) (No. 86-1145). The Hospital medical staff in
Patrick had organized pursuant to medical bylaws. Id. at 15. The medical staff executive
committee consisted of the officers of the medical staff, the chiefs of each clinical service,
and one member that the staff elected at large. Id. The executive committee conducted
professional review proceedings if an officer of the medical staff, a chief of any service, the
chairman of any standing committee of the medical staff, the Chief Executive Officer, or the
Hospital's governing board requested the executive committee to do so. Id. at 16.
126. Patrick, 800 F.2d at 1504.
127. Id.
128. Id. According to the Patrick circuit court, the charges against Patrick originally
encompassed 21 cases, some of which Patrick had not handled. Id. The Ninth Circuit stated
that the experts at trial disagreed as to the magnitude of Patrick's errors in the nine cases.
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though Patrick requested that the committee members testify as to personal
knowledge of the cases under investigation and as to personal biases against
Patrick, the committee members refused. 29 Furthermore, the committee
members were inattentive during Patrick's presentation. 3 0 As Patrick believed that the Committee ultimately would revoke his medical staff privileges because of the members' personal biases against him, Patrick resigned
from the Hospital before the Committee had completed its proceedings."
On the basis of the Committee proceedings and Patrick's resulting
forfeiture of staff privileges, Patrick filed an antitrust action in the United
States District Court for the District of Oregon in early 1981, naming the
members of the Executive Committee and the Hospital as defendants. 13 2 In
his complaint, Patrick alleged that the defendant Clinic partners had initiated
and participated in the hospital review proceedings to reduce competition
from Patrick, rather than to improve patient care, thereby violating sections
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 33 The district court jury found that three
individual Clinic members had violated section 1 of the Sherman Act and
that the Clinic had violated section 2 of the Sherman Act. 34 Accordingly,
the district court awarded Patrick damages of $650,000 against the three
individual Clinic members and the Clinic as a unit. 35 Pursuant to the federal
antitrust laws, the district court trebled Patrick's damages, bringing Patrick's

129. Id.
130. Id. During the hearings to revoke Patrick's medical staff privileges in Patrick, the
members of the professional review committee read, did paperwork, and in one case, tied
fishing lures. See Comment, Patrick v. Burget: The State Action Doctrine and Bad Faith Peer
Review, 74 VA. L. REv. 609, 615 (1988) (describing defendants' conduct during professional
review hearing).
131. Patrick, 800 F.2d at 1504.
132. Id.
133. Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658, 1661 (1988). The plaintiff in Patrickalleged that
the defendant physicians conspired among themselves to restrain competition in and to
monopolize the practice of surgery within the relevant market, thereby violating §§ 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act. Second Amended and Supplemental Complaint, reprinted in Joint
Appendix for the Supreme Court at 2, 4, Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988) (No. 861145). Patrick defined the relevant product market as the practice of general, vascular, and
thoracic surgery. Id. at 3. Patrick defined the relevant geographic market as northern Clatsop
County, Oregon, and the southern part of Pacific County, Washington. Id. Patrick alleged a
substantial effect on interstate commerce by alleging that total surgical fees in the relevant
geographic market exceeded $1,000,000 per year, a substantial portion of which Washington
residents pay. Id. at 3-4. Furthermore, Patrick alleged that the practice of surgery within the
relevant geographic market substantially affects interstate commerce because the hospital and
surgeons purchase a substantial quantity of medical equipment and supplies from out-of-state
manufacturers. Id. at 4. Finally, Patrick alleged that the hospital and surgeons received
substantial amounts of money from out-of-state sources, such as Medicare, Medicaid, and
insurers. Id.
134. Patrick, 800 F.2d at 1504.
135. Id. at 1504-05. The district court jury in Patrick awarded Patripk $20,000 in
compensatory damages and $90,000 in punitive damages against three individual defendant
physicians on a state law claim. Id. at 1505. In addition, the court awarded Patrick $228,600
in attorney's fees. Id.
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total damages award for antitrust violations to $1,950,000.136 The Clinic
doctors appealed the district court decision to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on the ground that state statutes mandated

their professional review activities at the hospital, and consequently, the
state action doctrine exempted the Committee members from federal anti37
trust liability.
On appeal the Ninth Circuit did not apply the HCQIA to the facts of

Patrick because Congress did not enact the HCQIA until after the professional review proceedings in Patrick had occurred. 3 Rather, the Ninth
Circuit considered only whether the professional review committee's actions
were immune from antitrust liability under the state action doctrine. 39 First,

the Ninth Circuit considered whether the professional review committee
acted pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state
policy to displace competition with regulation.'14 The court noted in general

that defendants could establish that a state clearly has articulated an
anticompetitive policy by demonstrating that the state legislature contemplated the kind of activity of which the plaintiff has complained.' 4' The
court found that the Oregon statutes regulating hospital licensing required

hospital governing boards to establish procedures for restricting medical
staff privileges.

42

Furthermore, the court found that Oregon statutes man-

dated that each hospital's medical staff organize to review each other's
professional practices at the hospital, and that other physicians participate

actively in determining whether a physician's performance endangers patient

care. 143 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit found that Oregon, by compelling

136. Id. at 1504-05. Since the district court awarded judgment in the Patrick case, the
Astoria Clinic has filed for bankruptcy and is seeking a buyer. Snow, Trust Versus Antitrust,
T-m ATLANTic, Sept. 1986, at 26, 28.
137. Patrick, 800 F.2d at 1505. The defendants in Patrick raised the state action doctrine
as an affirmative defense in their answer to Patrick's Second Amended and Supplemental
Complaint. Answer to Second Amended and Supplemental Complaint, reprinted in Joint
Appendix for the Supreme Court at 8, 11, Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988) (No. 861145). Evidently, the district court rejected the state action doctrine as an affirmative defense
for the defendants, as the case proceeded to the jury for a verdict. See Patrick, 800 F.2d at
1504 (discussing jury verdict in Patrick).
138. Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658, 1667 n.8 (1988).
139. Patrick, 800 F.2d at 1505.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. The Ninth Circuit in Patrick found that Oregon requires its health care facilities
to receive a license from the state. Id.; see OR. REv. STAT. § 441.015 (1987) (stating that no
person or governmental unit shall establish, maintain, or manage health care facility in state
of Oregon without license).
143. Patrick, 800 F.2d at 1505. The Patrick circuit court stated that the state designed
the statutes to reduce morbidity and mortality and to improve patient care. Id.; see OR. REv.
STAT. § 441"030(2) (1987) (stating that Health Division may suspend or revoke license if Health
Division finds health care facility has failed substantially to comply with statutory requirements);
OR. REv. STAT. § 441.055(3)(c), (d) (1987) (requiring governing body of health care facility to
insure that procedures for granting, restricting, and terminating privileges exist and that medical
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physicians to review their competitors in the health care market, affirmatively had expressed a policy to replace pure competition with anticompetitive

regulation. 44
The Ninth Circuit next considered whether Oregon's statutory scheme
satisfied the second prong of the state action test by providing for active
state supervision of the professional review committees' actions. 4 The

Patrick court found that Oregon statutes require a hospital that revokes a
physician's privileges to report promptly to the state's Board of Medical

Examiners (Board) all facts and circumstances that necessitated the revocation. 4 The court concluded that this required report to the Board
constituted supervision. 47 Furthermore, the court reasoned that, because the
Board is a state agency, supervision by the Board of professional review

committee action is equivalent to supervision by the state.

4

In addition,

the Ninth Circuit noted that the Oregon courts had jurisdiction to review
all hospital decisions revoking a physician's medical staff privileges.1 49 The

Patrickcircuit court concluded that the combination of the hospital's system
of internal review, the Board's review of the professional review committee's

decision, and the possibility of further judicial review constituted adequate
state supervision to satisfy the second prong of the state action test. 50

Consequently, the Ninth Circuit held that the members of the professional
review committee in Patrickwere immune from antitrust liability under the
state action doctrine.'-" Because the committee members were immune from
liability under the state action doctrine, the court ruled that the substantial
evidence which demonstrated that the defendants had acted in bad faith in
the professional review process was irrelevant.152 Consequently, the Ninth

staff reviews professional practices of facility). The Ninth Circuit also found that the Oregon
statutory scheme requires doctors to participate actively in regulating their peers. Patrick, 800
F.2d at 1506. Consequently, the court found that, under the Oregon statutory scheme,
competitors regulate each other through the peer review process. Id.
144. Id.at 1505-06.
145. Id. at 1506. The Ninth Circuit in Patrick found that the Oregon statutory scheme
requires health care facilities to regularly review privilege termination procedures to ensure
that the procedures conform with applicable law. Id.; see OR. REv. STAT. § 441.030(2) (1987)
(stating that Health Division may revoke hospital's license if Health Division finds that hospital
has failed to comply substantially with statutory requirements); OR. REV. STAT. § 441.055(3)(c)
(1987) (requiring governing body of health care facility to insure procedures for terminating
privileges exist).
146. Patrick, 800 F.2d at 1506; see OR. REv. STAT. § 441.820(1) (1987) (requiring health
care facility to promptly report to Board all privilege terminations and facts and circumstances
that resulted in termination).
147. Patrick, 800 F.2d at 1506.
148. Id.
149. Id. In Patrick the Ninth Circuit stated that Oregon courts have reviewed adverse
privilege decisions to determine if the hospital made the decision in good faith pursuant to
fair procedures and that the facts supported the hospital's decision. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1509.
152. Id. at 1507. The Ninth Circuit in Patrick conceded that Patrick had presented
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Circuit reversed the district court's judgment on the antitrust claims against
the members of the professional review committee. 1 3 Patrick appealed the
decision of the Ninth Circuit to the United States Supreme Court on the
ground that the state action doctrine did not protect the members of the
15 4
committee from antitrust liability.
When the Supreme Court reviewed Patrickin 1988, the Court considered
whether the Oregon statutory scheme that regulated hospital and physician
licensing satisfied the two requirements of the state action doctrine, thereby
protecting the members of the professional review committee in Patrick
from antitrust liability.1 55 The Court began its analysis of the professional
review action by examining the nature of state supervision over the anti56
competitive conduct of hospital professional review committees in general.
The PatrickCourt stated that to constitute active supervision, the state must
have and must exercise the power to review specific anticompetitive acts of
private parties and to disapprove those anticompetitive acts that fail to
accord with state policy because the acts promote only the party's anticompetitive interests.1 57 However, in Patrick, the Court found no evidence that

substantial evidence that defendants acted in bad faith in the peer review process. Id. However,
the Patrick circuit court stated that, once the court has determined that a state has acted to
replace competition with regulation in a given market, the state regulations displace federal
antitrust laws. Id.; see supra note 62 (explaining that, once court has determined defendants'
anticompetitive conduct is immune from antitrust liability under state action doctrine, evidence
of defendants' bad faith irrelevant).
153. Patrick, 800 F.2d at 1507. In addition to reversing the judgment of the district court,
the Patrick circuit court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether Patrick
had any other actionable antitrust claims based on conduct other than the professional review
process. Id.
154. Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658, 1660 (1988).
155. Id. at 1662-63; see supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text (describing two-pronged
test for determining whether state action doctrine bars antitrust action). The Supreme Court
did not apply the HCQIA to the facts in Patrick because Congress enacted the HCQIA after
the professional review proceedings in Patrickhad occurred and because the HCQIA was not
retroactive. Patrick, 108 S. Ct. at 1667 n.8.
156. Patrick, 108 S. Ct. at 1663. The Supreme Court in Patrick stated that it need not
analyze the Oregon statutory scheme under the first prong of the test to determine whether
the members of the committee acted pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy to displace
competition with regulation because the professional review action failed the second requirement
of the state action doctrine. Id. In analyzing the second prong of the state action doctrine,
the Patrick Court noted that the active supervision requirement recognizes that where a private
party engages in anticompetitive activity his actions may further his own interests and not the
state's interests. Id. Therefore, according to the Patrick Court, the active supervision requirement of the state action doctrine ensures that the state action doctrine will shelter only the
acts of private parties that, in the judgment of the state, actually further state regulatory
policies. Id.
157. Id. According to the Supreme Court in Patrick, the mere presence of some state
involvement or monitoring is insufficient to satisfy the active supervision requirement of the
state action test. Id. Rather, the state must exercise ultimate control over the anticompetitive
conduct of private parties. Id. Without such active supervision, a court has no assurance that
a private party's anticompetitive conduct promotes state policy and not the interests of the
individual. Id.
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the Oregon Health Division, the Board of Medical Examiners, or the state
judicial system could review private decisions regarding hospital privileges
to determine whether the decisions of professional review committees furthered state regulatory policies by promoting quality health care. 5 ' Furthermore, the Court found that none of the three conceivable state actorsthe Health Division, the Board, and the courts-reviewed private decisions

regarding hospital privileges to protect against abuses of the professional
review system. 5 9 Therefore, although the Oregon state statutes compelled

158. Id.; see infra note 159 and accompanying text (discussing Patrick Court's rationale
for holding that Oregon statutory scheme did not provide Health Division, Board, or judiciary
with power to review private decisions regarding hospital privileges).
159. Patrick, 108 S. Ct. at 1663-65. In Patrick the Supreme Court analyzed the statutory
powers of the state's Health Division, the Board, and the judiciary. Id. The Court acknowledged
that Oregon's Health Division has general supervisory powers over matters relating to the
preservation of life and health and over hospital licensing and health law enforcement. Id. at
1663-64; see OR. REy. STAT. § 431.110(1) (1987) (providing Health Division with direct
supervision of all matters relating to preservation of life and health of people of state); OR.
RE. STAT. § 441.025(1) (1987) (stating that Health Division shall license health care facility
if Health Division finds that applicant facility complies with statutory requirements); OR. REv.
STAT. § 441.030(2) (1987) (stating that Health Division may deny, suspend, or revoke hospital's
license if Division finds hospital has failed to comply substantially with Oregon statutes). OR.
REv. STAT. § 431.120 (1) (1987) (empowering Health Division to enforce state health policies
and rules); OR. REv. STAT. § 431.150 (1987) (providing Health Division with general enforcement powers); OR. REv. STAT. § 431.155(1) (1987) (providing that Health Division may institute
court proceedings to enjoin health care facility, officers, agents, employees, and representatives
from violating public health laws). However, despite the Health Division's extensive powers,
the Supreme Court in Patrick found that the statutory scheme does not constitute a state
program of active supervision over peer review decisions. Patrick, 108 S. Ct. at 1664. In so
holding, the Supreme Court distinguished between the Health Division's authority over the
procedures used to terminate hospital privileges and the termination of privileges itself. Id.
Accordingly, the Court stated that the state does not actively supervise this restraint on
competition unless a state official has and exercises authority over private privilege determinations. Id. Because the Oregon statutory scheme fails to provide the Health Division with
authority to review private peer review decisions and overturn a decision that fails to conform
to state policy, the Court concluded that the activities of the Health Division under Oregon
law fail to satisfy the active supervision requirement of the state action doctrine. Id.
The Court next considered whether the Board actively supervised private peer review
decisions. Id. The Court stated that the Board's principal function is to regulate licensing of
physicians in the state. Id. The Court recognized that Oregon statutes require hospitals to
promptly notify the Board of a decision to terminate or restrict a physician's privileges. Id.;
see OR. REv. STAT. § 441.820(1) (1987) (requiring health care facility to report in writing to
Board any privilege restrictions or terminations and all surrounding facts and circumstances).
However, the Court found that the Oregon statutes do not provide the Board with power to
review private privilege decisions. Patrick, 108 S. Ct. at 1664. Consequently, the Court
concluded that the Board does not engage in active supervision over private peer review
decisions. Id.
Finally, the Court in Patrick considered whether the state judiciary actively supervises
private peer review decisions. Id. at 1664-65. The Court stated initially that Oregon has no
statute expressly providing for judicial review of privilege terminations. Id. at 1665. Moreover,
the Court could cite no case in which an Oregon court held that judicial review of peer review
decisions is available. Id. In addition, the Supreme Court found that, even if Oregon courts
were to review hospital peer review proceedings, the reviewing court only would determine
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hospitals to conduct professional review, 160 the Court found that Oregon's
statutory provisions failed to meet the active supervision requirement of the
state action doctrine.' 6' Accordingly, the Court found that in the State of
Oregon, professional review committees and individual committee members62
are not immune from antitrust liability under the state action doctrine.
Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit and
63
reinstated the district court's judgment.
The judicial analyses of the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court in
Patrick demonstrate the confused state of antitrust law in professional

whether the hospital afforded the plaintiff some sort of reasonable procedure and whether
evidence existed from which the peer review committee could find that plaintiff's conduct
posed a threat to patient care. Id. The Supreme Court found that this kind of deferential
judicial review failed to satisfy the state action doctrine's requirement of active supervision
because the court would not review the merits of a termination decision to determine whether
the decision accorded with state regulatory policy. Id.
160. See OR. REv. STAT. § 441.055(3)(c), (d) (1987) (requiring hospital governing boards
to insure that procedures exist for terminating privileges and to insure that medical staff
reviews professional practices of facility).
161. Patrick, 108 S.Ct. at 1665.
162. Id. at 1665-66.
163. Id. at 1666. Although the acts challenged in Patrick occurred before Congress enacted
the HCQIA, the HCQIA would not immunize the actions of the defendants in Patrick. See
42 U.S.C. § 11111(a) (Supp. 1988) (immunizing members of professional review committee if
professional review action satisfies statutory definition of professional review action and if
committee adhered to statutory standards); 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a) (Supp. 1988) (listing standards
professional review committees must follow to receive immunity from liability under the
HCQIA); 42 U.S.C. § 11151(9) (Supp. 1988) (defining "professional review action" as action
of professional review committee that committee takes based on competence or professional
conduct of individual physician). In enacting the HCQIA, Congress did not intend to immunize
professional review committees that take illegitimate anticompetitive actions under the guise
of furthering the quality of health care. See H.R. REP. 5540, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG.
REc. 9954, 9957 (1986) (statement of Rep. Waxman) (stating that HCQIA does not immunize
professional review committees that base actions on anticompetitive purposes). Accordingly,
the HCQIA protects only professional review committee members participating in a good faith
review based on the individual physician's competence or professional conduct that endangers
the health or welfare of patients. See 42 U.S.C. § 11151(9) (Supp. 1988) (defining "professional
review action" as action based on competence or professional conduct of individual physician).
In Patrick the Supreme Court found a great deal of evidence that the professional review
committee members based their decision to revoke Patrick's medical staff privileges on Patrick's
refusal to join the Clinic partnership rather than on Patrick's competence as a physician or
Patrick's ability to get along with the other members of the medical staff. Patrick v. Burget,
108 S. Ct. 1658, 1661-62; see supra notes 115-30 and accompanying text (summarizing evidence
that professional review committee members acted in bad faith). Consequently, because the
members of the professional review committee in Patrickbased their action on considerations
other than Patrick's competence or professional conduct, the members would not qualify for
immunity from liability under the HCQIA. See 42 U.S.C. § 1111 (a) (Supp. 1988) (immunizing
members of professional review committee if professional review action satisfies statutory
definition of "professional review action" and if committee adhered to statutory standards);
42 U.S.C. § 11151(9) (Supp. 1988) (defining "professional review action" as action of
professional review committee that committee takes based on competence or professional
conduct of individual physician).
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review committee cases. 16 Examining the applicable statutes, the Ninth
Circuit in Patrickfound that the state action doctrine protected the members
of the professional review committee from antitrust liability. 16 Looking at
the same statutes, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held
that the state action doctrine does not protect members of professional
review committees in Oregon from liability.166 Furthermore, the Patrick
analysis did not even consider the professional review committee's action
under the HCQIA, which would have complicated and lengthened the
analysis significantly.1 67 The Patrick case also demonstrates the kinds of
abuses that can occur in the professional review procedure, in which private

164. See supra notes 138-63 and accompanying text (summarizing Ninth Circuit's and
Supreme Court's opinions in Patrick).
165. See supra notes 138-54 and accompanying text (summarizing Ninth Circuit's reasoning
in Patrick); cf. Marrese v. Interqual, Inc., 748 F.2d 373, 374 (7th Cir. 1984) (concluding that
members of professional review committee exempt from federal antitrust law under state action
doctrine), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1027. In Marrese the Seventh Circuit evaluated the Indiana
statutory scheme under the state action doctrine to determine whether the members of a
professional review committee were immune from antitrust liability. Id. at 387-95. The Seventh
Circuit found that Indiana statutes required hospitals to establish a peer review committee to
evaluate patient care. Id. at 388; see IND. CODE § 34-4-12.6-1 (1986) (requiring hospitals to
establish peer review committees). Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit found that the defendants
acted according to a clearly articulated state policy to displace competition with regulation,
thereby meeting the first requirement of the state action doctrine. Marrese, 748 F.2d at 38889. The Seventh Circuit next analyzed whether the state of Indiana satisfied the second prong
of the state action doctrine by actively supervising the medical review process. Id. at 389-94.
The Seventh Circuit construed Indiana statutes that authorized peer review committees to
release their records to the Indiana Medical Licensing Board for recommended disciplinary
action as statutes that transformed the Indiana Medical Licensing Board into an official state
body to review the determinations of medical peer review committees. Id. at 389; see IND.
CODE § 34-4-12.6-2(b) (1986) (allowing peer review committees to disclose records to state
board of licensure that committee believes is necessary for recommended disciplinary action).
But see Patrick, 108 S. Ct. at 1664 (stating that, because Oregon statutes do not authorize
Board to disapprove private privileges decisions, Board does not actively supervise professional
review committee conduct). The Marrese circuit court also found that Indiana statutes entitled
the Indiana Hospital Licensing Council to review the confidential minutes of medical staff
peer review committees to determine whether hospitals are providing quality medical care while
acting in accordance with approved medical standards. Marrese, 748 F.2d at 389-90; see 410
IND. ADMN. CODE § 15-1-8(1)(c) (1984) (authorizing Licensing Council inspectors to review
minutes of medical staff review committees). But see Patrick, 108 S. Ct. at 1664 (stating that
state does not actively supervise professional review committees' activities unless state has and
exercises ultimate authority over private privilege determinations). Because the Marrese court
found that the Medical Licensing Board and the Hospital Licensing Council actively supervised
the conduct of professional review committees, the court found that the defendants' conduct
satisfied the second element of the state action test. Marrese, 748 F.2d at 390-91. Accordingly,
the Marrese court held that the state action doctrine exempted the defendants' actions from
federal antitrust laws, thereby affirming the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint.
Id. at 395.
166. See supra notes 155-63 and accompanying text (summarizing Supreme Court's decision
in Patrick).
167. See supra note 138 and accompanying text & note 155 (stating that Ninth Circuit
and Supreme Court did not analyze Patrickusing HCQIA).
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doctors have the power unfairly to impair their competitors' careers.

68

The

confusion and complexity of judicial analysis, the need to protect participants in good faith professional review actions from crippling liability, and

the need to protect competent physicians from vindictive professional review
actions indicate the need for corrective state legislation. 69
Principles of federalism give the states, as independent sovereigns, power
to act judicially or legislatively to protect the state's commerce and further
legitimate state goals. 70 The judicially-created state action doctrine allows
the states, acting as sovereigns, to further state goals of promoting quality

medical care and protecting public health through good faith professional
review, by overriding federal antitrust law.' 7' In the same manner that the
states have used the judicially created state action doctrine, states can use
their power as sovereigns to enact legislation that would lessen the burdens

of courts deciding physicians' antitrust suits against professional review

committee members. 72 A state statute legislating professional review actions
would consolidate into one source all the issues that a court must consider

in deciding a physician's suit against the members of a professional review
committee. 73 Additionally, because the statute explicitly would describe the

procedures that professional review committees must follow in evaluating a
physician's medical staff privileges, the members of the professional review
committee more easily could adhere to the statutory requirements necessary
to immunize their actions. 74 Thus, states could further the goal of promoting

quality medical care and the goal of protecting public health by protecting
physicians who participate in good faith professional review actions and

protecting competent physicians from wrongful professional review actions,
75
while simultaneously increasing the efficiency of the courts.

168. See supra notes 115-30 and accompanying text (describing defendants' conduct in
Patrick).
169. See supra notes 25-100 and accompanying text (describing complicated judicial
analysis necessary to resolve antitrust action physician has brought against members of
professional review committee); supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (explaining Congress'
desire to protect participants in legitimate professional review actions from liability); supra
notes 115-30 and accompanying text (describing defenda.nts' vindictive behavior and bad faith
professional review proceedings in Patrick).
170. See supra note 47 (summarizing federalist rationale behind state action doctrine).
171. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text (explaining two-pronged test courts use
to determine whether individuals' actions satisfy state action doctrine).
172. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text (explaining two-pronged test courts use
to determine whether actions of individuals satisfy state action doctrine); infra notes 201-10
and accompanying text (describing how satisfying state action doctrine through appropriate
legislation would decrease amount of judicial analysis required to resolve physician's antitrust
suit).
173. See infra notes 201-10 and accompanying text (describing how satisfying state action
doctrine through appropriate legislation would decrease amount of judicial analysis required
to resolve physician's antitrust suit).
174. See infra notes 201-10 and accompanying text (describing how satisfying state action
doctrine through appropriate legislation would decrease amount of judicial analysis required
to resolve physician's antitrust suit).
175. See infra notes 206-15 and accompanying text (explaining how proposed legislation
would further states' goals).
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State legislatures could achieve their objectives of decreasing the amount
of judicial analysis necessary to resolve antitrust cases and protecting the

parties involved in the professional review process in several ways. 7 6 Several

states have chosen to alleviate the complexity of judicial analysis by pro-

viding blanket immunity for the members of professional review committees,
regardless of the propriety of members' motives in revoking a physician's
medical staff privileges. 77 Legislation providing immunity even for bad faith
professional review action eliminates the current complexity of the law by
eliminating a plaintiff physician's cause of action against the members of
the professional review committee. 7 8 In addition, statutes providing blanket
immunity serve the purpose of encouraging competent physicians to participate in professional review proceedings. 7 9 However, statutes providing

blanket immunity for the professional review committee members have
profound disadvantages.s 0 First, competent physicians who are unpopular

or eccentric in some way not detrimental to public health may suffer a loss
of livelihood because professional review committees wrongfully can remove

the physicians from the hospital medical staff without fear of liability.' 8'
Second, the legislation does not provide the best possible protection for the
public.8

2

Public health suffers if professional review actions based on bad

faith motives have the effect of removing competent physicians from the
competitive market by terminating existing medical staff privileges and
hindering the physician's ability to get medical staff privileges at other
hospitals.181 Consequently, contrary to the legislature's goals of promoting

176. See infra notes 177-210 and accompanying text (describing alternative methods state
legislatures could utilize to prevent lengthy judicial analysis in antitrust cases).
177. See IDAHO CODE § 39-1392c (1985) (immunizing members of professional review
committees from civil liability without conditioning immunity on good faith standard); ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 111 1/2 para. 151.2 (Smith-Hurd 1988) (same); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-12.6-3
(Supp. 1988) (immunizing committee members if they act in good faith); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 32, § 3293 (1988) (same); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.25 (Baldwin Supp. 1988)
(same); R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-17-25(b) (1985) (same).
178. See supra note 177 (listing statutes abolishing physicians' cause of action against
members of professional review committee).
179. See James, Peer Review Among Doctors Receives Boost, Wall St. J., Oct. 10, 1986,
at 31, col. 3 (stating that, as result of district court's treble damages award in Patrick, many
physicians began to refuse to participate in peer reviews); H.R. REP. No. 903, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6384, 6385 (stating that
doctors who are sufficiently fearful of threat of litigation will not do meaningful peer review).
180. See infra notes 181-84 and accompanying text (discussing disadvantages of blanket
immunity statutes).
181. See 1 Lewin & Assocs., Competition Among Health Practitioners:The Influence of
the Medical Profession on the Health Manpower Market, Executive Summary and Final
Report, Feb. 1981, 11-28 (stating that, for many physician specialists, hospital privileges are
indispensable to their practice); supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text (discussing effects
loss of medical staff privileges has on physician's career).
182. See infra notes 183-84 and accompanying text (describing harmful effect blanket
immunity statutes has on public health).
183. See M. Pollard & R. Liebenluft, Antitrust and the Health Professions:Policy Planning
Issues Paper 100-02 (FTC Office of Policy Planning July 1981) (summarizing ways consumers
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the public health and improving the quality of health care, the quality of

public health care presumably will decline if professional review committees
wrongfully may revoke, without threat of sanctions, a physician's medical
staff privileges.'1
In addition to failing to provide the best possible protection for the
public and failing to protect competent but unpopular physicians from

wrongful professional review actions, statutes providing blanket immunity
undercut the purpose of the federal antitrust laws. 8 5 For example, a statute

providing blanket immunity for the members of professional review committees would immunize from liability even the members of the professional
review committee in Patrick, whose behavior the Ninth Circuit termed as
"shabby, unprincipled and unprofessional."'18 6 Congress designed the anti-

trust laws to protect businesses from monopolies and restraints on trade
imposed by larger companies or combinations of companies. 8 7 Similarly,
antitrust laws also should operate to protect unpopular, although competent,
physicians from restraints on trade and monopolistic conduct that fellow

physicians impose. 88 Because blanket immunity statutes protect committee
members who have based their actions on anticompetitive motives instead
of a concern for improving the quality of health care, blanket immunity
statutes circumvent the legitimate purposes of the antitrust laws.8

9

Conse-

quently, state statutes providing blanket immunity to members of professional review committees fall to protect the general public and a physician

whose medical staff privileges a professional review committee wrongfully

suffer when hospitals unreasonably limit privileges). According to Pollard and Liebenluft,
consumers suffer in several ways when hospitals unreasonably limit privileges. Id. at 100.
Restricting the supply of physicians enables physicians with medical staff privileges to charge
higher fees. Id. More significantly for consumers, however, adverse professional review decisions
restrict the choices of available physicians. Id. at 101. Not only may consumers lose the
services of physicians the consumers prefer, but especially in rural and underserved areas,
consumers may lose the only available source of care. Id.
184. See H.R. REP. No. 903, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMnw. NEws 6384, 6384 (stating that purpose of HCQIA is to improve quality of

medical care by encouraging physicians to identify and discipline incompetent physicians).
185. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text (explaining procompetitive intent of
Sherman Act).
186. See Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498, 1509 (9th Cir. 1986) (describing conduct of
members of professional review committee in Patrick), rev'd on other grounds, 108 S. Ct.
1658 (1988); e.g., IDAHO CODE § 39-1392c (1985) (immunizing members of professional review
committees from civil liability without conditioning immunity on good faith standard); ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 111 1/2 para. 151.2 (Smith-Hurd 1988) (same); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 32,
§ 3293 (1988) (same); Omno REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.25 (Baldwin Supp. 1988) (same); R.I.
GEN. LAws § 23-17-25(b) (1985) (same).
187. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text (discussing congressional intent behind
Sherman Act).
188. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text (discussing congressional intent behind
Sherman Act).
189. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text (discussing purposes of Sherman Act);
supra notes 31-41 and accompanying text (discussing limited immunity that HCQIA provides
to professional review committee members).
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has revoked, and provide undue protection for the members of professional
review committees acting in bad faith. 19°
As an alternative to a state statute providing blanket immunity to
members of professional review committees regardless of the members'
underlying motives in terminating a physician's medical staff privileges,
some states have chosen to enact statutes that are similar to the HCQIA. 191
These state statutes immunize committee members only if the members have
acted in good faith, and have based their decision on a reasonable belief
that the facts, as determined after reasonable investigation, warranted
revoking the physician's medical staff privileges. 19 Under statutes that

190. See supra notes 180-89 and accompanying text (describing disadvantages of blanket
immunity statutes).
191. See infra note 192 and accompanying text (listing state statutes with provisions similar
to HCQIA's).
192. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-333(a) (Supp. 1988) (immunizing committee members if they
act without malice and in reasonable belief that facts warrant action); ALAsKA STAT. § 18.23.020
(1986) (immunizing committee members if they act in reasonable belief that facts warrant
action); Amuz. Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 36-2402(B) (Supp. 1988) (immunizing committee members
if they act without malice); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-9-502(a) (immunizing committee members
if they act without fraud or malice); CAL. Civ. CODE § 43.7(b) (West Supp. 1989) (immunizing
committee members if they act without malice, have made reasonable effort to obtain facts
of matter as to which they act, and act in reasonable belief that facts warrant action); CoNN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-19a(c) (West 1987) (immunizing committee members if they act without
malice and in reasonable belief that facts warrant action); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1768(a)
(Supp. 1988) (immunizing committee members if they act in good faith and without malice);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.011(8) (Supp. 1988) (immunizing committee members if they act in
good faith and without intentional fraud); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-132(a) (Supp. 1988)
(immunizing committee members unless malice motivated action); HAw. REv. STAT. § 36-6631.7(b) (Supp. 1987) (immunizing committee members if they act without malice); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 65-4442(a) (1985) (immunizing committee members if they act in good faith and
without malice); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.377(1) (Baldwin Supp. 1988) (providing that any
person to whom hospital has granted medical staff privileges waives claim for damages for
committee members' good faith actions); MD. HEALTH Occ. CODE ANN. § 14-601(f) (Supp.
1988) (immunizing committee members if actions are in good faith); MICH. COmp. LAWS ANN.
§ 331.531 (West 1980) (immunizing committee members unless they act with malice); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 145.63 subdiv. 1 (West Supp. 1989) (immunizing committee members if they
act without malice and in reasonable belief that facts warrant committee's action); MIss. CODE
ANN. § 73-25-93(b) (Supp. 1988) (immunizing committee members if they act without malice);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.035 (Vernon 1988) (immunizing committee members if members act in
good faith and without malice); MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-2-201(1) (1987) (immunizing committee
members if they act without malice and in reasonable belief that facts warrant committee's
action); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22.10 (West Supp. 1988) (same); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 419-4 (1987) (same); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-j.2 (McKinney Supp. 1989) (immunizing
committee members if members act in good faith and without malice); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
131E-95(a) (1988) (immunizing committee members if they act without malice or fraud); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 23-01-02.1 (Supp. 1987) (immunizing committee members if they act without
malice and in reasonable belief that facts warrant committee's action); OKLA. STAT. tit. 76, §
28 (Supp. 1989) (immunizing committee members from all liability except for civil rights
violations and antitrust violations if members act in good faith and pursuant to statutory
procedural requirements); OR. REv. STAT. § 41.674(4) (1987) (immunizing committee members
if they act in good faith); S.D. CODIMD LAWS ANN. § 36-4-25 (1986) (immunizing committee
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condition immunity from liability on the committee members' good faith

actions, committee members who base an action on reasons unrelated to
the physician's competence or professional conduct are liable for their
wrongful actions. 193 Therefore, statutes basing immunity for members of
professional review committees on the good faith of the committee members

provide better protection for unpopular but competent physicians from
wrongful professional review actions than statutes providing blanket immunity for committee members.' 94 However, statutes providing immunity
for good faith professional review actions do little to alleviate the complex

legal analysis courts must apply in considering antitrust suits against the
members of a professional review committee. 95 At a minimum, a court still
must hear evidence of the professional review committee's motives. 96 If a
physician fails to prove that the committee members acted in bad faith, the

suit is dismissed without the further analysis that the HCQIA, the state
action doctrine, and the antitrust laws require. 9 7 If, however, the physician
members if they act without malice and in reasonable belief that facts warrant committee
action); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-219(b) (Supp. 1988) (immunizing committee members if they
act in good faith, without malice, and on basis of facts reasonably believed to exist); TEx.
Rav. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 4447d, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1989) (immunizing committee members
if they act without malice and in reasonable belief that facts warrant committee's action);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-12-25(1) (Supp. 1988) (immunizing committee members if they act in
good faith and without malice); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1442(a) (Supp. 1988) (immunizing
committee members if they act without malice and in reasonable belief that facts warrant
committee's action); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.16 (Supp. 1988) (immunizing committee
members unless they act in bad faith or with malicious intent); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. §
4.24.240(2) (1988) (immunizing committee members if they act in good faith); W. VA. CODE
§ 30-3C-2(b) (1986) (immunizing committee members if they act without malice and gross
negligence); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.37(1) (West Supp. 1988) (immunizing committee members
if they act in good faith); WYo. STAT. § 35-17-103 (1988) (immunizing committee members
unless their acts are malicious or grossly negligent and result in harm to another).
193. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 18.23.020 (1986) (immunizing committee members if
members act in reasonable belief that facts, as known to members after reasonable efforts to
obtain facts upon which is action based, warranted action); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.011(8)
(Supp. 1988) (immunizing committee members if act in good faith and without intentional
fraud); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-95(a) (1988) (immunizing committee members if members act
without malice or fraud).
194. See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text (explaining why statutes that condition
immunity from liability on good faith of committee members provide better protection for
competent but unpopular physicians).
195. See infra notes 196-98 and accompanying text (describing appropriate judicial analysis
in states with statutes providing immunity to professional review committee members who
have acted in good faith).
196. See, e.g., CAL. Crv. CODE § 43.7 (West Supp. 1989) (immunizing committee members
if members act without malice, have made reasonable effort to obtain facts of matter as to
which members act, and act in reasonable belief that facts known to members warranted
action); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.011(8) (Supp. 1988) (immunizing committee members if members
acted in good faith and without intentional fraud); VA. CODE. ANN. § 8.01-581.16 (Supp.
1988) (immunizing committee members unless members acted in bad faith or with malicious
intent).
197. See supra notes 26-42 and accompanying text (summarizing HCQIA analysis); supra
notes 57-62 (summarizing state action doctrine analysis).
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succeeds in establishing that the members of the professional review committee acted in bad faith, the state statute would not immunize the members
from liability, and as a result, the physician still must overcome the state
action doctrine and prove his antitrust case. 98 Because the evidence necessary
to prove that the committee members acted with improper motives is

inherently speculative, bad faith is very difficult to prove, and thus good
faith immunity statutes provide inadequate protection for physicians whose

privileges the committee has wrongfully revoked.' 99 Therefore, while the
blanket immunity statutes go too far in immunizing all professional review
committees regardless of motive, the good faith immunity statutes do not
reach far enough to be of significant value in protecting physicians from

wrongful conduct or in solving the problems of overloaded courts.2
The Patrick case provides a key to the solution to the task facing state
legislatures in their attempt to lessen courts' burdens in resolving antitrust
cases against professional review committee members and to protect the

interests of all parties involved in the professional review process. 201 In
Patrick the Supreme Court rested its decision to deny state action doctrine

immunity to the members of the professional review committee members
on the lack of adequate supervision from the state of Oregon over the
conduct of professional review committeesY0 If the Oregon statutes explicitly

had provided for adequate supervision, the state action doctrine may have
provided immunity for the defendants, and the court would have been one
step closer to resolving the case without extensive review of the members'
motives or the plaintiff's antitrust case. 203 Thus, if a state legislature were,

198. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text (summarizing state action doctrine
analysis); supra notes 73-100 and accompanying text (summarizing antitrust analysis). If the
physician proved that the members of the professional review committee fail to qualify for
immunity under the state statute because they did not act in good faith, the committee members
would not receive immunity from liability under the HCQIA. See 42 U.S.C. § 11151(9) (Supp.
1988) (defining "professional review action" as action of professional review body that the
body has based on competence or professional conduct of individual physician); 42 U.S.C. §
11111(a) (Supp. 1988) (stating that members of professional review committee are immune
from liability if professional review action complies with definition in 42 U.S.C. § 11151(9)).
199. See 132 CONG. R.nc. H9954, H9961 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1986) (letter of Rep. Edwards)
(stating that physicians have difficulty challenging fairly administered professional review
actions because courts are reluctant to second guess decisions that medical professionals have
made regarding physician's competency); supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text (describing
nature of evidence plaintiff must present to show that defendant committee members acted in
bad faith for purposes of HCQIA).
200. Compare supra notes 180-90 and accompanying text (discussing disadvantages of
blanket immunity statutes) with supra notes 195-99 and accompanying text (discussing disadvantages of good faith immunity statutes).
201. See infra notes 201-04 and accompanying text (explaining why Patrickprovides state
legislatures with solution to problem of lessening courts' burdens and protecting interests of
parties involved in professional review process).
202. See supranotes 155-63 and accompanying text (summarizing Supreme Court's decision
in Patrick).
203. See supra notes 155-63 and accompanying text (summarizing Supreme Court's decision
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in effect, to satisfy permanently the requirements of the state action doctrine
by incorporating the intent and supervision requirements into a statute,
courts could eliminate the currently necessary factual review and dismiss
2°
many cases based solely upon a review of the state statute. 4
Additionally, if the statute incorporated the requirements of the HCQIA,
a single state statute could determine the outcome of not only antitrust
suits, but also suits based on all other legal theories of recovery. 2°5 A single
source for all the relevant law would streamline analysis greatly. 206 In this
way, courts reviewing antitrust cases would have only to ascertain that a
statutory scheme satisfies the state action doctrine and that the professional
review committee proceedings complied with the requirements of the statute.2 0 7 If the statute accurately reflects the requirements of the state action
doctrine, and if the hospital complies with the terms of the statute, the
members of the professional review committee would qualify for immunity
from antitrust liability under the state action doctrine and for immunity
from liability under all other legal theories under the HCQIA. 20 The first
inquiry is straightforward, and involves only reading the words of the statute
to determine that the legislature intended to displace competition with
regulation. The second inquiry would involve determining whether the state
supervisor named in the statute had, in fact, monitored the professional
review proceedings to ensure that the committee members based their actions
on legitimate motives. 2° 9 If the court finds that supervision that the statute
required did not, in fact, take place, the court could proceed directly to
2 10
traditional antitrust analysis.
By enacting legislation that consolidates the state action doctrine with
the HCQIA standards, the legislature not only shortens the judicial analysis

in Patrick). To satisfy both requirements of the state action doctrine, the Oregon statutory
scheme would have had to articulate clearly and express affirmatively the state's intent to
displace competition with regulation, as well as provide for adequate state supervision. See
supra note 156 (stating that Supreme Court did not analyze whether Oregon statutory scheme
satisfied first requirement of state action doctrine).
204. See infra notes 207-10 and accompanying text (explaining judicial analysis necessary
to resolve physicians' antitrust actions in states that have enacted proposed regulations).
205. See infra notes 207-10 and accompanying text (explaining judicial analysis necessary
to resolve physicians' antitrust actions in states that have enacted proposed regulations).
206. See infra notes 207-10 and accompanying text (explaining judicial analysis necessary
to resolve physicians' antitrust actions in states that have enacted proposed regulations).
207. See infra note 210 and accompanying text (summarizing judicial analysis if proposed
statute existed).
208. See infra notes 216-34 and accompanying text (describing proposed state legislation).
209. See infra notes 216-34 and accompanying text (describing proposed state legislation).
210. See infra notes 216-34 and accompanying text (describing proposed state legislation);
supra notes 73-100 and accompanying text (explaining antitrust analysis). The court would not
have to determine whether the state action doctrine exempts the members of the professional
review committee from antitrust liability because, by finding that the committee failed to
comply with the statutory scheme satisfying the state action doctrine, the court has found that
the state did not supervise actively the conduct of the committee members. See supra notes
60-61 and accompanying text (describing active supervision requirement of state action doctrine).
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necessary to resolve a physician's action against the members of a profes-

sional review committee, but the legislature also furthers its goals of
promoting public health and safety. 21' The legislature encourages physicians
to participate on professional review committees because the committee

members are immune from liability under all state and federal laws. 212 The
proposed state legislation also furthers the state's interest in protecting
competent physicians from wrongful professional review actions. 21 3 By incorporating the requirements of the HCQIA explicitly in the state statute,

the state will ensure that professional review committees base their actions
on the physician's competence or professional conduct and that those
physicians whose medical staff privileges the professional review committee
has revoked lost their medical staff privileges because of incompetence or
professional misconduct.21 4 In sum, appropriate state legislation would im-

prove the professional review proceedings by ensuring proper motives,
providing better protection for the members of the professional review

committee, lessening the chance for litigation; and reducing the amount of

21 5
judicial analysis required to untangle the legal theories involved.

To achieve its goals effectively, the legislative enactment must incorporate both requirements of the state action doctrine.21 6 First, the state

legislation must articulate clearly and affirmatively a legislative intent to

displace competition with professional review committee regulation. 217 Leg-

islatures can satisfy this requirement easily by inserting the appropriate
language into the statute. 218 In addition, if the statute does not state explicitly

211. See infra notes 213-15 and accompanying text (explaining how proposed state
legislation furthers state's goals of promoting public health and safety).
212. See 132 CONG. REc. H9954, H9957 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1986) (statement of Rep.
Waxman) (stating that limited immunity that HCQIA provides to members of professional
review committees is essential to encourage hospitals and physicians to participate in effective
peer review). Because the proposed legislation would protect the members of the professional
review committee from all liability if the committee complied with the statute, the legislation
would discourage physicians from filing suits against members of professional review committees. See 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a) (Supp. 1988) (immunizing from all liability professional review
actions that satisfy the HCQIA definitions and standards).
213. See infra note 214 and accompanying text (explaining how proposed legislation
protects competent physicians from wrongful professional review actions).
214. See Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658, 1663 (1988) (stating that active state supervision
requires that state officials have and exercise power to disapprove anticompetitive action of
private parties that promote private parties' individual interests); infra note 226 and accompanying text (explaining how state legislation satisfying state action doctrine ensures that
professional review committee members base actions on good faith motives).
215. See infra notes 237-41 and accompanying text (describing advantages of state legislation satisfying state action doctrine and HCQIA standards).
216. See infra notes 217-34 and accompanying text (proposing means legislatures may use
to satisfy both requirements of state action doctrine).
217. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97,
105 (1980) (stating that state must articulate clearly and express affirmatively state policy to
displace competition with regulation); supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text (explaining
state action analysis).
218. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97,
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a legislative intent to displace competition with regulation, a court will infer

a legislative intent to displace competition if the court finds that the
legislature contemplated that professional review committees would revoke
physicians' medical staff privileges. 2 9 Consequently, the legislature easily
can satisfy the first requirement of the state action doctrine. 220

The legislature's more difficult task is to satisfy the second requirement
of the state action doctrine-providing for active state supervision of all
professional review decisions. 221 Although some state statutes require that
hospitals promptly notify the state health department or the state board of

medical examiners if a hospital has revoked a physician's medical staff
privileges, the statutes do not provide that the state agency monitor the
proceedings or review the hearing record. 222 The Supreme Court in Patrick

stated that the active supervision prong of the state action doctrine requires
that the state exercise ultimate control over the professional review committee's conduct. 223 Consequently, according to the Patrick Court, the active
supervision prong of the state action doctrine requires that state officials
have and exercise power to review the acts of professional review committees
and disapprove those acts that do not comply with state policy. 4 Therefore,
the state legislature must provide that a state agency, such as the state
health department or state board of medical examiners, review all profes-

sional review committee decisions affecting a physician's medical staff
privileges. 225 The state agency that the statute indicates will review the
105 (1980) (stating that state must articulate clearly and express affirmatively state policy to
displace competition with regulation).
219. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf., Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 64
(1985) (stating that private party acting pursuant to anticompetitive state regulatory program
need not point to specific detailed legislative authorization to justify challenged conduct); Scott
v. City of Sioux City, Iowa, 736 F.2d 1207, 1211 (8th Cir. 1984) (stating that state has
adequately articulated intent to displace competition in certain area when authority given to
municipality to operate in area indicates that legislature contemplated kind of activity antitrust
plaintiff challenges).
220. See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text (explaining how state legislation can
satisfy first requirement of state action doctrine).
221. See infra notes 222-26 and accompanying text (discussing difficulties of satisfying
second requirement of state action doctrine in proposed legislation); supra notes 60-61 and
accompanying text (explaining second requirement of state action doctrine).
222. See Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct 1658, 1664 (1988) (stating that, although Oregon
statutes require hospitals to promptly notify Board of decision to terminate privileges, Oregon
statutes do not provide Board with power to disapprove private privilege decisions); OR. Rav.
STAT. § 441.820(I) (1987) (requiring health care facility that terminates physician's privileges
to promptly report, in writing, to Board all facts and circumstances that resulted in termination).
223. Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658, 1663 (1988).
224. Id. The Supreme Court in Patrick noted that unless the state actively supervises acts
of professional review committees by reviewing professional review committee decisions and
disapproving committee decisions that fail to accord with state policy, the state cannot ensure
that the professional review committee's acts promote state policy rather than the interests of
the individual members. Id.
225. See id. at 1664 (stating that state does not actively supervise termination of medical
staff privileges unless state official has and exercises ultimate authority over private privilege
determinations).
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professional review committee's decisions must ascertain that the members
of the professional review committee based the committee's decision on the
physician's competence and professional conduct, and not on personal
6

anticompetitive motives.2
The legislature may provide for review of professional review committee
decisions in any of three ways.? 7 First, the legislature may provide that a
state agency review the record of the professional review committee proceedings after the committee has completed the proceedings.? This method,
although requiring minimal effort on the part of the agency, may be

inadequate to detect the kinds of procedural improprieties that occurred
during the professional review committee proceedings in Patrick.29 Furthermore, unless the reviewing agency supplements the record with its own

investigation, the agency may not know about prior events unrelated to the
physician's conduct in the hospital that spurred the members of the profesprivileges, such as the
sional review committee to terminate the physician's
20

physician's refusal to join a medical association.
Second, the legislature may require the reviewing agency to conduct its
own separate de novo hearing. 131 This alternative is inefficient because 2a
separate hearing unnecessarily duplicates already completed proceedings .

Third, the legislature may require agency representation at the professional
review proceedings.233 The presence of an agency representative at the hearing
would improve the chances that the physician would receive a fair hearing,
and the agency representative immediately could interview immediately those
parties central to the proceeding to determine whether reasons other than

226. See id. at 1663 (stating that, unless state actively supervises termination of medical
staff privileges, state cannot ensure that private party's anticompetitive conduct promotes state
policy rather than merely party's individual interests).
227. See infra notes 228-34 and accompanying text (describing alternative methods states
may use to ensure state actively supervises professional review actions).
228. See Patrick, 108 S. Ct. at 1664 (stating that, under Oregon statutory scheme, Health
Division does not actively supervise privilege termination because Division has no power to
review private peer review decisions).
229. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text (describing defendants' conduct at
hearing to terminate Patrick's medical staff privileges).
230. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text (describing Patrick's rejection of
Clinic partners' offer to join Clinic partnership and instead establishing independent practice
in Astoria).
231. See Patrick, 108 S. Ct. at 1663 (stating that active supervision requirement of state
action doctrine requires that state exercise ultimate control over challenged anticompetitive
conduct).
232. See 132 CoNG. R c. H9954, H9960 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1986) (statement of Rep.
Edwards) (stating that costs of challenging wrongful peer review involve costs to challenging
physician and to peer review participants).
233. See Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658, 1663 (1988) (stating that active supervision
requirement of state action doctrine requires that state officials have and exercise power to
review private parties' anticompetitive acts and disapprove those acts that fall to accord with
state policy).

1000

WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 46:961

the concern for improving the quality of health care motivated the members
23 4
of the professional review committee to act.
A state statute that satisfies both requirements of the state action
doctrine effectively will protect the members of the professional review
committee from antitrust liability if the committee complies with the statute. 2 5 However, a state statute satisfying the state action doctrine will not
protect the members of the professional review committee from other types
of liability, leaving a court to evaluate the suit under other legal theories. 216
Therefore, to make the court's analysis as easy as possible, to provide
maximum protection to the members of the professional review committee,
and to prevent the committee from taking vindictive professional review
actions against competent physicians, the state statute should also include
the standards for professional review actions that the HCQIA sets. 237 A
state statute that satisfies the state action doctrine ensures that the professional review committee bases its actions on a physician's competence and
professional conduct, thereby complying with the HCQIA's definition of
professional review action.28 To fully satisfy HCQIA standards, the statute
also must require professional review committees to act in the reasonable
belief that their actions further quality health care; to act after a reasonable
effort to obtain the facts of the matter; to act after providing adequate
notice and hearing; and to act in the reasonable belief that the facts
warranted the committee's action. 23 9 Because the supervision provision of
the statute would require a neutral state agency official to oversee the
professional review proceeding, the official could attest that the members
of the committee based their action on legitimate motives and adhered to
the statutory notice and hearing requirements.? If the statute satisfied the
state action doctrine and required professional review committees to comply

234. See supra notes 107-31 and accompanying text (describing facts of Patrick and
defendants' conduct at committee hearings).
235. See supra notes 216-34 and accompanying text (explaining methods that legislature
can use to satisfy state action doctrine).
236. See supra note 14 (summarizing other legal theories physicians may use in action
against members of professional review committees).
237. See supra notes 30-39 and accompanying text (discussing HCQIA standards for
professional review actions).
238. See supra note 226 and accompanying text (explaining how statute will ensure
professional review committee bases its action on physician's competence and professional
conduct); 42 U.S.C. § 11151(9) (Supp. 1988) (defining "professional review action").
239. See 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a) (Supp. 1988) (establishing standards for professional review
actions); supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text (summarizing adequate notice and hearing
procedures in context of HCQIA).
240. See 42 U.S.C. § 11151(9) (Supp. 1988) (defining "professional review action"); id.
§ 11112 (establishing standards for professional review actions); id. § 11111(a) (immunizing
members of professional review committees that meet definition of professional review action
and comply with statutory standards); supra note 226 and accompanying text (describing how
statute satisfying state action doctrine ensures that members of professional review committees
base their actions on physician's competence and professional conduct).
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with HCQIA, then the members of the professional review committee would
be immune from all liability under any state or federal law. 241
Currently, courts deciding physicians' antitrust suits against members
of professional review committees must untangle a complex web of legal
theories to analyze the action. 242 The court must apply the Health Care
Quality Immunity Act, 243 the state action doctrine,2 and standard antitrust
doctrine. 241 The state legislatures now have the opportunity to play a
significant role in simplifying the existing judicial analysis. 24 State legislatures should enact legislation that ensures that the conduct of professional
review committees meet the requirements of the state action doctrine and
the HCQIA. 247 This legislation should take the form of a clear expression
of the legislative intent to displace antitrust laws with professional review
committee regulation of physicians' medical staff privileges, coupled with
provisions for active state supervision of professional review committees. 24s
Additionally, the legislation should satisfy the HCQIA's standards by requiring professional review committees to base their actions on good faith
motives and provide notice and a fair hearing to the physicians whose
medical staff privileges the committee has challenged. 249 State legislation
that addresses these points greatly could streamline the judicial analysis
necessary to resolve physicians' antitrust claims against the members of
professional review committees, by merging all the relevant law into one
statute. 2 0 Additionally, the legislation would ensure legitimate professional

241. See 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a) (Supp. 1988) (immunizing members of professional review
committees from all liability if actions comply with definitions and standards of HCQIA).
242. See supra notes 25-100 and accompanying text (describing legal theories courts must
apply to resolve physicians' antitrust suits against members of professional review committees).
243. See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text (describing judicial analysis necessary
to determine whether members of professional review committee qualify for immunity under

HCQIA).
244. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (describing judicial analysis necessary
to determine whether members of professional review committee are exempt from antitrust
liability under state action doctrine).
245. See supra notes 73-100 and accompanying text (describing antitrust analysis). In
addition to examining plaintiff physician's antitrust suit under the HCQIA, the state action
doctrine, and federal antitrust analysis, the court must consider whether the members of the
professional review committee qualify for immunity under an applicable state statute. See
supranote 177 (listing state statutes that provide blanket immunity for members of professional
review committees); supra note 191 (listing state statutes that immunize members of professional
review committees if members acted in good faith).
246. See supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text (explaining how states have power to
enact proposed legislation).
247. See supra notes 201-10 and accompanying text (explaining reason states should enact
legislation satisfying state action doctrine and HCQIA requirements).
248. See supra notes 216-34 and accompanying text (explaining how legislature may satisfy
requirements of state action doctrine).
249. See supra notes 236-41 and accompanying text (explaining how proposed legislation
will satisfy HCQIA standards).
250. Comparesupra note 241 and accompanying text (describing judicial analysis necessary
to resolve physician's antitrust suit if state statute satisfies state action doctrine and HCQIA
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review actions by protecting professional review committee members from
liability and competent physicians from wrongful professional review actions. 25' Consequently, state legislatures promptly should enact the proposed
legislation to simplify the necessary judicial review and to protect more
fully both professional review committee members and physicians whose
25 2
medical staff privileges are under attack.
Kym OLTROGGE

standards) with supranotes 25-100 and accompanying text (describing judicial analysis necessary
to resolve physician's antitrust suit if no state statute satisfies state action doctrine and HCQIA
standards).
251. See supra notes 211-15 and accompanying text (explaining that proposed state statute
would protect participants in good faith professional review action from liability and competent
physicians from wrongful professional review actions).
252. See supra notes 210-15 and accompanying text (summarizing reasons state legislature
should enact legislation satisfying state action doctrine and HCQIA standards).

